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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT FOR MINORS:
AN EIGHTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout American history, children and adolescents have been
sentenced to death for their crimes.' The imposition of death sentences
on these young offenders, far from being a practice of the past, is a real-
ity of the present. Eighteen of the 1,137 inmates currently on the na-
tion's death rows2 committed their crimes when they were under
eighteen years old.3 It is expected that many more youths will receive
death sentences in the years ahead. 4 Until recently, little has been said
in the capital punishment debate about the constitutionality of impos-
ing the death penalty on minors. 5 The issue, however, increasingly is
I See infra notes 22, 34 and accompanying text.
2 Andersen, An Eye for an Eye, 121 Time 28, 28 (January 24, 1983).
3 Brief for Petitioner at 19a (Appendix E), Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioner]; Chicago Tribune, June 20, 1982, § 3, at 4, col. 1.




























































* Information from Brief for Appellant, supra, at 19a (Appendix E).
** Information from Chicago Tribune, supra, at 4, col. 1.
4 See infra notes 75-87 and accompanying text.
5 A plethora of articles and books have been written on capital punishment. But only
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coming to the attention of the public, 6 the state courts,7 and even the
United States Supreme Court,8 as adolescents begin to challenge their
death sentences on the ground that capital punishment for minors is
unconstitutional.
9
Although the Supreme Court has held that the death penalty is not
unconstitutional per se, 10 it has not yet ruled on the constitutionality of
capital punishment when applied to minors.II This Comment examines
whether sentencing these young offenders to death violates the excessive-
ness strand 12 of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the
eighth amendment.' 3 The Comment first discusses the history, present
status, and likely future of capital punishment for minors. 14 With the
necessary background thus provided, the Comment then shows that
capital punishment for minors violates the eighth amendment because a
death sentence is always excessive punishment when imposed on young
offenders. 1
two articles have discussed the imposition of the death penalty on minors. See BedauJuveni/es
and CapitalPunishment, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 52 (H. Bedau 2d rev. ed. 1967);
Gwin, The Death Penaly." Cruel and Unusual Punishment When Imposed Upon Juveniles, 45 KY.
BENCH & B. 16 (April 1981).
6 Various civic and professional organizations have taken an interest in the issue. See,
e.g., Amici Curiae Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104 (1982); Amici Curiae Brief of National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Na-
tional Legal Aid and Defender Association, and American Orthopsychiatric Association, Ed-
dings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
7 See, e.g., Eddings v. State, 616 P.2d 1159 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980), rev'don other grounds,
455 U.S. 104 (1982); State v. Valencia, 124 Ariz. 139, 602 P.2d 807 (1979) (en banc).
8 See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982). The Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Eddings to determine whether capital punishment for minors violates the eighth amend-
ment of the Constitution. 450 U.S. 1040 (1981). The Court did not decide the issue, however,
as it was able to reverse the juvenile defendant's death sentence on the ground that the sen-
tencer had refused to consider the juvenile's troubled childhood and emotional problems in
mitigation of the death penalty. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. at 112-17; see infira note 153
and accompanying text. On remand, Eddings again was sentenced to death. Telephone In-
terview with Mr. Jay C. Baker, Monty Lee Eddings' attorney (December 14, 1982). Because
Eddings once again is challenging his sentence on the ground that it is unconstitutional to
sentence minors to death, the Supreme Court may soon have another opportunity to resolve
this issue. See infra note 271 and accompanying text.
9 See cases cited supra notes 7 & 8.
10 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
11 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 18; see also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
12 See in/ta notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
13 See in/fa note 95 and accompanying text.
14 See in/fa notes 16-87 and accompanying text.
15 See hi'sa notes 100-259 and accompanying text.
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II. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT FOR MINORS: PAST, PRESENT
AND FUTURE
A. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
I The Treatment of Minors at Common Law
The United States, during the late eighteenth to mid-nineteenth
century, applied the English common law rules concerning the criminal
liability of children and older adolescents. 16 Under these rules, there
was an irrebuttable presumption that children below the age of seven
were incapable of forming criminal intent.' 7 Thus, these minors were
never liable for their felonious acts. 18 Children between seven and four-
teen also were presumed to be incapable of entertaining criminal in-
tent.' 9 But in their case, the presumption could be rebutted by a
showing that the child was able to distinguish between right and wrong
and had understood the nature of his or her act and that it was wrong.
20
Children fourteen years or older were deemed fully capable of forming
criminal intent and therefore always were liable for their criminal of-
fenses.21 Consequently, during this early period of American history,
children and adolescents could be, and were, tried, convicted, and sen-
tenced to death.22
2. The Development of the Juvenile Justice System
In the 1820's, a fundamental change in the treatment of young of-
fenders began to develop in the United States, and the seeds of the juve-
16 See A. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 198-99 (2d ed.
1977).
17 Frey, The Ciminal Responsibility of the Juvenile Murderer, 1970 WASH. U.L.Q. 113, 113.
18 This was the necessary result of the common law view that these children never were
capable of forming criminal intent, as such a capability is a prerequisite of criminal liability.
Id.
19 1 L. RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRA-
TION FROM 1750: THE MOVEMENT FOR REFORM 12 (1948).
20 Id.; Frey, supra note 17, at 113.
21 L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 19, at 12; Frey, supra note 17, at 113. For further informa-
tion about the common law rules regarding the criminal liability of children, see W. CLARK &
W. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES § 6.12 (6th ed. 1958); J. MILLER,
HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW § 34 (1934); R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 837-40 (2d ed.
1969). Today, 34 states retain these common law rules, although in statutory form. The
remaining states, while retaining the categories of presumptions, have raised the maximum
age at which a child is viewed as incapable of forming criminal intent. Frey, supra note 17, at
132. The Model Penal Code recommends that minors under 16 be deemed incapable of
entertaining criminal intent. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.10 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
22 See A. PLA'rr,spra note 16, at 211-12. Many of the death sentences imposed on minors
during this period were carried out. It was common for adolescents aged 16 and over to be
executed. See id. Though there was a tendency to overturn or commute the sentences of
young children, at least two minors aged 12 and under were put to death between 1806 and
1882. Id.; see Godfrey v. State, 31 Ala. 323 (1858); State v. Guild, 10 NJ.L. 163 (1828).
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nile justice system known today were planted. Early reformers were
appalled that children could be sentenced to death or given long prison
sentences and mixed in jails with hardened criminals. 23 These "child
savers"2 4 of the 1800's
were profoundly convinced that a society's duty to the child could not be
confined to the concept of justice alone. They believed that society's role
was not to ascertain whether the child was 'guilty' or 'innocent' but 'what
is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best to be done in his
interest and in the state's to save him from a downward career.' The child
essentially good, as they saw it was to be made to feel that he is the object
of [the state's] care and solicitude .... 25
Believing that young offenders should be rehabilitated rather than
punished, early reformers focused initially on the correctional phase of
the criminal justice system. They fought against the execution of minors
and advocated the establishment of facilities exclusively for juveniles,
where the young offenders could be treated and cared for.2 6 Their de-
mands for separate facilities eventually were answered by state legisla-
tures, and the 1820's saw the establishment of numerous juvenile
institutions,27 including the New York House of Refuge28 and the Chi-
cago Reform School.
29
23 See Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform- An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1187, 1189
(1970).
24 A. PLATr, supra note 16 (coins the term "child savers" for these reformers).
25 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967).
26 One author explains:
The critical philosophical position of the reform movement was that no formal, le-
gal distinctions should be made between the delinquent and the dependent or neglected.
The adolescent who broke the law should not be viewed and treated as an adult offender
.... He should not be considered an enemy of society but society's child who needs
understanding, guidance and protection. The goals of the program are rehabilitation
and protection from the social conditions that lead to crime.
Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversagy System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L.
REV. 7, 9-10.
27 See, e.g., Act of March 4, 1826, ch. 182, § 3 Mass. Laws 327; Act of March 23, 1826, ch.
47, Pa. Laws 133.
28 The New York House of Refuge, founded in 1825, was the first juvenile correctional
facility established in the United States. Fox, supra note 23, at 1187. In chartering the House
of Refuge, the New York legislature granted to the Society for the Reformation of Delin-
quents the "power in their discretion to receive and take into the House of Refuge to be
established by them, all such children as shall be ... convicted of criminal offenses ... as
may . . .be proper objects .... " Id. at 1190 (quoting Act of March 29, 1824, ch. 126 § 4,
N.Y. Laws 111). For further information about the New York experiment, see R. PICKETr,
THE HOUSE OF REFUGE (1967); 1 D. SCHNEIDER, THE HISTORY OF PUBLIC WELFARE IN
NEW YORK STATE 1609-1866 (1938).
29 The Chicago Reform School rejected the New York House of Refuge's large dormitory
or "congregate" format in favor of a program structured along familial lines. As the School's
Superintendent stated in his first annual report:
Our government of the school has been parental. We have labored to introduce as much
of the family as possibly [sic] into our management of the school. We have made it our
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These efforts to create separate juvenile facilities developed, during
the late 1890's and early 1900's, into a juvenile court movement. Recog-
nizing that the establishment of juvenile correctional institutions alone
was not sufficient to meet the special needs of children and adolescents,
reformers sought to establish courts exclusively for young offenders.
These courts were to abandon the rigid procedures and adversarial
processes of the criminal courts and to adopt practices sensitive to the
needs of children and dispositions suited to the goals of rehabilitation.
30
The first such court was established in 1899 when Illinois passed its Ju-
venile Court Act.31 By 1925, every state except Maine and Wyoming
had followed Illinois' lead, enacting some type of juvenile court stat-
ute.32 Though the precise formulas varied, all of the juvenile court sys-
tems shared three characteristics: a lack of formal adversary
proceedings; an extensive prehearing investigation of an offender's back-
ground; and an attempt to prescribe for each offender a rehabilitation
program most fit for his or her needs.
33
Although societal attitudes toward young offenders changed dra-
matically during this period of American history, children and adoles-
cents continued to receive the death penalty. Between 1864 and 1939,
at least twenty-eight people under age eighteen were executed.
34 Of
course, these minors were not sentenced to death by the juvenile courts,
which lacked the power to impose such punishment. Rather, these mi-
nors had been transferred from the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts to
that of the adult criminal courts.35
chief aim to fill a father's place to these unfortunate youth. . . . The law of kindness
has been our rule in regulating its discipline.
Fox, supra note 23, at 1208 (quoting FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE OFFICERS OF THE CHI-
CAGO REFORM SCHOOL TO THE BOARD OF GUARDIANS 14-15 (1856)). Although the school's
"familial" system followed the goals of the reform movement, the school's efforts were short-
lived. Judges developed a practice of sentencing only the most incorrigible youth to the
school. An Illinois Supreme Court decision, People ex rel. O'Connell v. Turner, 55 Ill. 280
(1870), prevented the school from taking custody of wayward children who had not been
charged with crimes. Finally, the Chicago fire in 1871 forced the closing of the school. See
Fox, supra note 23, at 1215-21.
30 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 15-16. For a discussion of the juvenile court movement and its
aims, see H. Lou, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1927); A. PLAIT, supra note
16; Mennel, Origins of the Juvenile Court. Changing Perspectives on the Legal Rights ofJuvenile Delin-
quents, 18 CRIME & DELINQ. 68 (1972).
31 Illinois Juvenile Court Act, ILL. LAWS 131 (1899). See generally BROUGHT TO JUSTICE?
JUVENILES, THE COURTS AND THE LAW 3 (R. Sarri & Y. Hasenfeld eds. 1976).
32 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 14-15; see also Fox, supra note 23, at 1229.
33 Seegenerally Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Ofender, 41 MINN. L. REV. 547 (1957); Note,
Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and IndividualizedJustice, 79 HARV. L. REv. 775
(1966).
34 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 37 (Table 1).
35 See NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, YOUTH IN ADULT COURTS: BETWEEN Two WORLDS 7 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
BETWEEN TWO WORLDS]; see also infra notes 43-61 and accompanying text.
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B. THE PRESENT SITUATION
. The Juvenile Justice System and the Transfer ofJuveniles to Criminal
Court
Today all states have juvenile court acts. 36 These courts have juris-
diction over three types of juveniles: (1) those who commit crimes; (2)
those who engage in status offenses; 37 and (3) those who "find them-
selves in a dependent state of being. '38 In most states, juvenile courts
retain jurisdiction over these youths until they reach age eighteen.
39
However, as in the early history of the juvenile court system, some mi-
nors who commit crimes can be, and often are, tried in adult courts,
40
where they may receive criminal penalties, including death.41 In 1978,
for example, 261,234 minors were tried in criminal courts on felony
charges.
42
Virtually every state has some process by which minors can be
transferred from the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts to that of the
criminal courts.4 3 The two principal transfer methods used by the states
are judicial waiver and legislative waiver.
44
36 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 n.19 (1966). See generally S. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF
JUVENILES: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM (2d ed. 1980) (current juvenile statutes in force
in each state are cited and summarized); M. LEVIN & R. SARRI, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: A
STUDY OF JUVENILE CODES IN THE UNITED STATES (1974).
37 Status offenses are acts that would not be crimes if performed by adults, such as being
truant, running away from home, and violating curfew regulations. Seegenerall A. SUSSMAN,
THE RIGHTS OF YOUNG PEOPLE 53-61 (1977).
38 NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE PREVENTION OF SERIOUS DELINQUENCY: WHAT To Do? 16 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as THE PREVENTION OF SERIOUS DELINQUENCY].
39 Thirty-eight states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government designate 18
as the maximum age for juvenile court jurisdiction. BETWEEN Two WORLDS, supra note 35,
at 44, 86 n.2. Eight states specify 17 as the maximum age, id. at 44 & 86 n.5 (Georgia, Illinois,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, South Carolina and Texas), and four states
designate age 16, id. at 44 & 87 n.6 (Connecticut, New York, North Carolina, and Vermont).
See generally Schornhorst, The Waiver ofJuvenile CourtJurisdiction: Kent Revisited, 43 IND. L.J.
583 (1968).
40 It is usually teenagers between ages 15 and 17 charged with serious crimes who will be
tried in criminal courts. See Schornhorst, supra note 39, at 592; U.S. Dep't of Justice,Juvenile
Crime Increase is Moderate, Compared to Adults, 3 JUST. ASSISTANCE NEWS, April 1982, at 2, 13
[hereinafter cited asJuvenile Crime Increase].
41 See infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
42 Conrad, Can Juvenile Justice Survive?, 27 CRIME & DELINQ. 544, 552 (1981).
43 Forty-six states and the District of Columbia have statutory systems for prosecuting
juveniles in criminal proceedings. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 49 & n.98. The federal
government also has provided for the prosecution of some juveniles in federal adult courts. See
Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (Supp. 1983) (allows for the transfer of
16- and 17-year-old offenders to adult courts). See generally Browne, Guidelinesfor Statutesfor
Transfer ofJuveniles to Criminal Court, 4 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 479, 480-81 (1977); Feld, Legislative
Policies Toward the Serious Juvenile Offender, 27 CRIME & DELINQ. 497, 500-11 (1981);
Schornhorst, supra note 39, at 595-98.
44 See generally D. BESHAROV, JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVOCACY: PRACTICE IN A UNIQUE
1476 [Vol. 74
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Under judicial waiver, the method employed by most states,45 the
juvenile courts are empowered to divest themselves ofjurisdiction in cer-
tain cases and to certify the minor to stand trial in criminal court.46 The
crime and age requirements for judicial waiver vary among the states.
4 7
There is greater uniformity, however, in the substantive criteria used in
making waiver decisions. Most jurisdictions follow the criteria suggested
by the Supreme Court,48 and require that juvenile courts waive their
jurisdiction only when the minor is not a suitable candidate for treat-
ment or when a disposition within the juvenile system would prove a
threat to public safety.
49
In determining whether a minor is a suitable candidate for treat-
ment, the courts typically consider the minor's age, the nature of the
minor's antisocial conduct, the treatment prognosis, and the available
COURT 249-64 (1974); Browne, supra note 43; Note,Juvenile Crime: The Misguided Target of the
Current Solution, 4 GLENDALE L. REV. 97 (1979). A third method, which is used by only a few
states, is prosecutorial waiver. Under this method, the juvenile and criminal courts have
concurrent jurisdiction over minors. The prosecutor chooses the forum in which the juvenile
is tried. See BETWEEN Two WORLDS, supra note 35, at 61; S. DAVis, supra note 36, at 2-9 to 2-
14.
45 Forty-six states, the District of Columbia and the federal government use judicial
waiver to make some or all of their transfer decisions. In 28 states and federal jurisdictions,
judicial waiver is the only mechanism for criminal prosecution. Feld, supra note 43, at 501 &
n. 12. See generally Schornhorst, supra note 39, at 597.
46 Typically, the process is initiated by the state prosecutor, who requests that the juvenile
be transferred to criminal court. A hearing is then conducted by the juvenile court to deter-
mine whether the minor should be transferred. See BETWEEN Two WORLDS, supra note 35, at
46. In 1978, 9,352 youths were transferred to criminal court by means of judicial waiver. Of
these, over 70% were 17, over 92% were male, and only 29% were charged with crimes against
the person. Conrad, supra note 42, at 552.
47 For example, in some jurisdictions, judicial waiver is permitted only if the minor is
accused of a felony. E.g., D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 11-1553 (West 1966); Ky. REV. STAT.
§208.170(1) (1977). In others, it is permitted with respect to any criminal offense. E.g., IOWA
CODE ANN. §232.45 (West 1982). Most states require that the juvenile be above a certain
age. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §232.45(6)(a) (West 1982) (14 or older); KY. REV. STAT.
§208.170(1) (1977) (over 16 unless charged with a class A felony or capital offense). Eleven
states, however, permit judicial waiver at any age, as long as the child is over the age for the
irrebuttable presumption of incapacity to form criminal intent. BETWEEN Two WORLDS,
supra note 35, at 46. E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 1112(b) (West 1980); see supra notes 17,
18, 21 and accompanying text.
48 The Supreme Court formally has ruled on only the procedural aspects of the judicial
waiver mechanism. See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (states must determine
whether to try a minor in juvenile or criminal court before proceeding against the youth on
the merits of a specific petition or complaint); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966)
(procedural due process must be observed in judicial waiver determinations). It never has
ruled on the substantive criteria used in reaching waiver decisions. However, in Kent v.
United States, the Court suggested, in dicta, that a minor should be transferred if "the juve-
nile. . . [is] beyond rehabilitation underJuvenile Court procedures, or if the public needs the
protection afforded by such action." 383 U.S. at 566.
49 Feld, supra note 43, at 502; A.B.A. JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, TRANS-
FER BETWEEN COURTS, No. 23, at 36 (1977) [hereinafter cited as JUSTICE STANDARDS
PROJECT].
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treatment resources. 50 The decision focuses on whether the minor can
be rehabilitated by the procedures, services and facilities currently avail-
able to the juvenile courts.5 1 Thus, a determination that a minor is not
a suitable candidate for treatment does not necessarily mean that the
minor is untreatable or incapable of being rehabilitated completely.
Rather, it may mean only that the juvenile justice system does not have
the necessary resources. 52 Indeed, two of the most common bases for
waiver are inadequate resources and insufficient time to effectuate
rehabilitation.
53
Factors considered in determining whether a disposition within the
juvenile system would prove a threat to public safety are the minor's
dangerousness and age. 54 In assessing the minor's dangerousness, the
courts typically consider the seriousness of the crime with which the mi-
nor is charged and the minor's past juvenile record. 55 Age plays a role
in these waiver decisions because minors can be retained in the juvenile
justice system only until they reach the maximum age of juvenile court
jurisdiction, which is usually eighteen. 56 Upon reaching this age, or
shortly thereafter, they must be released. Thus, when the juvenile court
determines that a minor is "dangerous,"' 57 it must consider the period of
time it has left in which to treat the youth. If the time is too short for
proper rehabilitation or the resources too inadequate to treat the minor
within the period of time available, the "dangerous" juvenile is trans-
50 Comment, Juveniles in the Criminal Courts: A Substantive View of the Fitness Decision, 23
UCLA L. REV. 988, 1012 (1976).
51 See JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, supra note 49, at 36; see also Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. at 566-67.
52 See, e.g., In re M.E., 584 P.2d 1340 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978) (court did not find that
minor was beyond rehabilitation, but held that the length of time that a juvenile is subject to
institutional care and the unavailability of adequate treatment resources within the juvenile
system are permissible bases for decision to certify minor for criminal prosecution).
53 Gaspar & Katkin, A Rationale for the Abolition of the Juvenile Court's Power to Waive Jurisdic-
tion, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 937, 941 (1980); Note, Waiver ofJuvenile Court Jurisdiction Under
Iowa's N ewJuvenileJustice Act, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 405, 428-29 (1980); Comment, supra note 50,
at 1004, 1007-08.
54 See Feld, supra note 43, at 502.
53 See id. The more serious a juvenile's present offense and the more prior delinquency
referrals the youth has had, the more likely it is that the juvenile will be transferred to crimi-
nal court. Juvenile Crime Increase, supra note 40, at 13.
56 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
57 The accuracy of any determination regarding dangerousness is certainly questionable.
The evidence overwhelmingly indicates that the capacity to determine dangerousness or to
predict future criminal behavior is "quite beyond our present technical ability." N. MORRIS,
THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 62 (1974); see also DANGEROUS BEHAVIOR: A PROBLEM IN
LAW AND MENTAL HEALTH (C. Frederik ed. 1978); J. FLOUD & V. YOUNG, DANGEROUSNESS
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1981); Monahan, The Prediction of Violent Behavior in Juveniles, in THE
SERIOUS OFFENDER 154 (1977); Schlesinger, The Prediction of Dangerousness in Juveniles: A Repli-
cation, 24 CRIME & DELINQ. 40 (1978).
1478 [Vol. 74
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ferred to criminal court, where he can receive a sentence that would
keep him in custody beyond his eighteenth birthday.
The principal alternative to judicial waiver is legislative waiver.
58
Under this method, statutes provide that minors charged with certain
specified crimes come automatically within the jurisdiction of the crimi-
nal courts. 59 The designated crimes are often capital and other serious
offenses.60 As in the case of judicial waiver, the minimum age at which
a youth can be transferred varies among the states.6 '
Serious criticisms have been levelled at both judicial62 and legisla-
tive63 waiver. However, they have withstood constitutional attack.64
58 Comment, A Modelfor the Transfer ofjuvenile Felony Ofenders to Adult Court Jurisdiction, 4 J.
Juv. L. 170, 174 (1980). Thirty-one jurisdictions use legislative waiver. BETWEEN Two
WORLDS, supra note 35, at 97. Virtually all of these jurisdictions, however, have judicial
waiver provisions as well. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-1-103(9), 19-1-104, 19-3-108
(1973). Legislative waiver is the mechanism by which most minors are placed in adult courts.
In 1978, for example, most of the 261,234 minors tried in criminal courts on felony charges
were placed there as a result of legislative waiver. Conrad, supra note 42, at 552.
59 Feld, supra note 43, at 508; Comment, supra note 58, at 174. As juvenile courts are
required solely by statute, legislatures are free to modify the court's jurisdiction in a variety of
ways. They can raise or lower the maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction. See supra note
39 and accompanying text. Or, as in the case of legislative waiver, they can exclude certain
crimes from the court's jurisdiction, thus bringing those offenses under the exclusive authority
of the criminal courts. See Feld, supra note 43, at 508; Comment, supra note 58, at 174.
60 Eleven of the 31 legislative waiver jurisdictions exclude only serious crimes from the
province of the juvenile courts. BETWEEN Two WORLDS, supra note 35, at 97. Most of these
jurisdictions exclude capital offenses or those punishable by life imprisonment, e.g., FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 39.02(5)(c) (West 1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:570A(5) (West 1980), but
some jurisdictions exclude broader categories of serious offenses, e.g., D.C. CODE ENCYCL.
§ 16-2301(3) (West 1978). A few exclude juveniles charged with certain repeat offenses, e.g.,
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-7.1 (1981). A majority of the legislative waiver jurisdictions, however,
do not exclude serious crimes. Twenty of the 31 legislative waiver jurisdictions exclude only
minor offenses, such as traffic and watercraft violations. BETWEEN Two WORLDS, supra note
35, at 97. But even in these states, minors charged with serious offenses can be tried in crimi-
nal courts, as such states typically have judicial waiver provisions as well. See supra note 58
and accompanying text.
61 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 13:1570A(5) (West 1980) (15 or older); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 30.00 (McKinney 1982) (13 or older for murder; 14 or older for other specified felonies or
attempted felonies).
62 The most common criticism ofjudicial waiver is that the standards of "dangerousness"
and "amenability to treatment" used are "in effect broad, standardless grants of discretion."
Feld, supra note 43, at 507; see, e.g., Schornhorst, supra note 39; Note, supra note 53; Comment,
supra note 50.
63 The major criticism of legislative waiver is that it contradicts the entire philosophy of
the juvenile justice system, as it allows minors to be transferred solely on the basis of the
offense charged, and thus many juveniles who could benefit greatly from the treatment avail-
able in the juvenile system and who may pose no future threat to society are subjected to the
criminal process. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 43, at 508-09; Comment, Waiver in Indiana: A Con-
flict with the Coa/s of the Juvenile Justice System, 53 IND. L.J. 601 (1978).
64 The substantive criteria of judicial waiver never have been challenged in the Supreme
Court. The lower appellate courts that have examined the standards have been unresponsive
to the various constitutional attacks, such as "void for vagueness," that have been made. See
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Even critics of these particular methods of transfer do not deny that
minors, in certain circumstances, should be moved to the criminal sys-
tem. 65 In fact, transfer is viewed as a functional necessity, required for
three important purposes: (1) to protect the public from those juveniles
whom the juvenile system is incapable of rehabilitating; (2) to deter
juveniles from committing serious crimes; 66 and (3) to ease the burden
on the juvenile justice system.6 7 Thus, though there may be criticism of
the particular methods by which transfer decisions are made, transfer
itself generally is accepted and is certain to remain a part of the juvenile
justice process.
2. Minors in Crninal Court
Once transferred to criminal court, a minor typically is eligible for
all criminal penalties, including death. In most of the thirty-eight capi-
tal punishment states,68 minors convicted of capital crimes may receive
the death penalty.69 In all such states, youth is a mitigating circum-
Feld, supra note 43, at 507 n.28. The courts also have upheld legislative waiver statutes
against repeated due process and equal protection challenges. See Feld, Reference ofjuvenile
Ofenders for Adult Prosecution. The Legislative Alternative to Asking Unanswerable Questions, 62
Minn. L. Rev. 515, 556-71 (1978).
65 See, e.g., Schornhorst, supra note 39, at 602 ("[w]aiver, therefore, remains an unsatisfac-
tory, but nevertheless practical, means of ridding the juvenile court of persons whom it is not
equipped to handle, and more likely than not, has mishandled in the first place"); Comment,
supra note 58, at 179 ("the transfer process clearly is needed to alleviate some of the problems
of the overburdened juvenile justice system"); cf. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 535 (1975)
("there appears to be widely shared agreement that not all juveniles can benefit from the
special features and programs of the juvenile-court system and that a procedure for transfer to
an adult court should be available"). That most critics of legislative and judicial waiver
object to these particular methods rather than to transfer itself is evidenced further by their
tendency to propose new transfer methods or to suggest ways to improve the present ones. See,
e.g., Feld, supra note 43, at 511-21; Comment, supra note 58, at 181-85.
66 But see infra notes 227-43 and accompanying text.
67 See NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GOALS, JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION (1976); Comment, supra note
58, at 179.
68 Andersen, supra note 2, at 28.
69 Brief for Respondent at 19, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982). Some death
penalty states do forbid the imposition of death sentences on minors, however. Eg., CAL.
P NAL CODE § 190.5 (West 1982) (under 18); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(f(l) (West
1982) (under 18); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(b) (Smith- Hurd 1978) (under 18); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 176.025 (1973 & Supp. 1977) (under 16); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:1(4) (1974)
(under 17); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 18-14 (1980) (under 18); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(b) (Mc-
Kinney 1975) (under 19); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.07(d) (Vernon 1981) (under 17). Al-
though in Kentucky the death penalty presently may be imposed on minors, the Kentucky
legislature recently passed a law, which goes into effect in 1984, prohibiting capital punish-
ment for those under 18 at the time of the offense. Amici Curiae Brief of the Kentucky Youth
Advocates at 2, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Brief of the
Kentucky Youth Advocates]. See KY. UNIFIED JUVENILE CODE, KY. REV. STAT.
§ 208A.340, ch. 208 (1980); S.B. 309 §1. 1 (1980), cited in Brief of the Kentucky Youth Advo-
cates, supra; see also KY. REV. STAT. § 208E.070(2) (effective July 15, 1984). The general
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stance 70 that can be proffered as a reason for a sentence less than
death. 71 And the youth of a juvenile defendant tends to be given great
weight by sentencing bodies.72 Nevertheless, the mitigating effect of
trend, however, seems to be in the opposite direction, with states that previously prohibited
capital punishment for minors removing the restriction. See infra note 85 and accompanying
text.
70 In a series of cases decided in 1976, the Supreme Court held that death penalty statutes
that adopt a mitigating-aggravating format are constitutional. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); cf. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S.
325 (1976) (mandatory death penalty statutes held to be unconstitutional); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). Since these decisions, all death penalty states have adopted
some form of aggravating-mitigating capital punishment system. Under this system, a capi-
tal sentencer must find at least one of the aggravating circumstances listed in the statute
before it can impose the death penalty. Aggravating circumstances vary among the jurisdic-
tions, but they usually include factors such as that the capital crime was "especially heinous,
atrocious or cruel," committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of another
felony, or committed for pecuniary gain. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 161; Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. at 248 n.6. Under this format, the defendant is permitted to proffer mitigat-
ing circumstances, which might justify a sentence less than death. These circumstances in-
clude the youth of the defendant at the time of the crime, the defendant's cooperation with
the police, the defendant's lack of a prior criminal record, and the fact that the defendant's
action occurred under duress or the domination of another. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 608 (1978); Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637, 641 (1978); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 273
(1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 249 n.6. The sentencer then balances the mitigating
factors against the aggravating ones to determine whether the death penalty should be im-
posed. See generally, Liebman & Shepard, Guiding Capital Sentencing Discretion Bqyond the "Boiler
Plate':" Mental Disorder as a Mitigating Factor, 66 GEO. L.J. 757, 791-806 (1978); Note, Right of a
Defendant to Have Any Relevant Aspect of His Character and Circumstance of Ofense Used as Factors
Mitigating a Death Sentence, 25 WAYNE L. REv. 1147 (1979).
71 Twenty-four capital punishment states specifically have designated an offender's youth
as a mitigating factor in their death penalty statutes. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 46-
47. Though the other death penalty states do not list specific mitigating circumstances in
their capital punishment statutes, decisions of the Supreme Court make it clear that capital
sentencers in these states are required to consider the defendant's youth in mitigation of the
death penalty. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
at 604, 608 (1978).
72 See, e.g., State v. Maloney, 105 Ariz. 348, 360, 464 P.2d 793, 805, cert. denied, 400 U.S.
841 (1970) (court reduces death sentence imposed at retrial on defendant who, at age 15,
killed his parents: "The defendant has committed a heinous crime, the sheer brutality of
which unquestionably shocked the jury. . . . Had he been of mature age the death penalty
would have gone undisturbed by this court. . . . Because of his immaturity we are per-
suaded that he should not die"); State v. Stewart, 197 Neb. 497, 524-27, 250 N.W.2d 849, 865-
66 (1977) (court reduces death sentence of 16-year-old: "[T]he defendant's age at the time of
the crime and the absence of any significant criminal record mitigate strongly against the
imposition of the death penalty'); Commonwealth v. Green, 396 Pa. 137, 147-48, 151 A.2d
241, 246 (1959) (court vacates death sentence imposed on youth age 15: "[That] his age is an
important factor in determining the appropriateness of the penalty. . . is greatly illustrated
by the fact that. . . no person under the age of 16 years and only one person under the age of
19 years has ever suffered the death penalty in this Commonwealth"). But see People v. West,
54 Ill. App. 3d 903, 909-10, 370 N.E.2d 265, 270-71 (1977) (affirming 56-100 year sentence
imposed on 16-year-old murderer: "Mouth and rehabilitation. . . are proper considerations
in the fixing of sentences, but they are not the sole elements. The nature of the crime, the
protection of the public, deterrence and punishment have equal status in the consideration").
1482 COMMENTS [Vol. 74
youth may be, and sometimes is, outweighed by the aggravating circum-
stances73 established in the case.74 When the scale so tips, the minor is
sentenced to death.
C. THE FUTURE
Various factors strongly suggest that more and more juvenile of-
fenders will be sentenced to death in the decades ahead. First, an in-
creasing number of minors charged with capital offenses probably will
be tried in criminal courts. The common perception that the United
States is in the grip of a massive juvenile crime wave75 has produced a
"get tough" attitude toward juvenile crime,76 leading many states to
73 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
74 This is demonstrated vividly by the fact that 18 juvenile offenders are currently on
death row. But see infra notes 180-87 and accompanying text.
75 See, e.g., Vandall, The Use of Force in Dealing with Juveniles: Guidelines, 17 CRIM. L. BULL.
124, 124 (1981) ("Juvenile crime is widespread, growing, and often violent.'); Note, supra note
44, at 97 (juvenile crime is a very "real and growing problem"); Comment, supra note 58, at
170 (problem of serious juvenile crime has reached "epidemic proportions"); cf. Weis &
Henry, Crime and Criminals in the United States in the 1970s, in CRIMINOLOGY REVIEW YEAR
BOOK (S. Messinger & E. Bittner eds. 1979) (more than two-thirds of adults in the United
States worry about becoming victims of residential burglary, a typical juvenile offense).
Juvenile crime is a serious national problem; juvenile arrests make up almost 40% of all
arrests for serious property and violent offenses. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SECOND ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT AGENCIES 25 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
REPORT OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT AGENCIES]. Recent studies, however, have
not supported the public's present perception that the decade of the 1970's produced a dra-
matic and disproportionate increase in serious and violent juvenile crime. For example, a
study sponsored by the National Center for Juvenile Justice found that juvenile crime posted
only a modest increase over the last decade when compared with crimes committed by adults,
and that personal victimizations committed by juveniles are less serious in terms of weapon
use, injury rate, and financial loss than similar crimes committed by adults. See H. SNYDER &
J. HUTZLER, THE SERIOUS JUVENILE OFFENDER: THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM AND THE
RESPONSE OF JUVENILE COURTS (1981). Another recent study reports that rates of being
victimized by juveniles for both property and personal crimes have remained relatively stable
for the past 10 years. See McDermott & Hindelang, Juvenile Criminal Behavior in the United
States: Its Trends andPattems , in 1 ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL VICTIMIZATION SURVEY DATA TO
STUDY SERIOUS DELINQUENCY BEHAVIOR (1981); Cf. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE
SOCIETY 55 (1967) [hereinafter cited as THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME] (report notes that
figures regarding juvenile contribution to overall crime may be distorted if figures are used as
only guide because: (1) juveniles are more easily apprehended than adults, and (2) the ten-
dency of juveniles to act in groups when committing crimes may produce numbers of arrests
significantly in excess of crimes actually committed); THE PREVENTION OF SERIOUS DELIN-
QUENCY, supra note 38, at ix, 18 (small percentage of all juvenile offenders account for a
majority of serious juvenile offenses; serious crime for which juveniles are least arrested is
murder).
76 See generally P. STRASBURG, VIOLENT DELINQUENTS (1978); TWENTIETH CENTURY
FUND TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS, CONFRONTING
YOUTH CRIME (1978) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE 1978]; Feld,Juvenile Court Legislative
Reform and the Seious Young Ofender: Dismantling the 'Rehabilitative Ideal," 65 MINN. L. REV. 167
(1981).
1983] CAPITAL PUNISHMENT FOR MINORS 1483
adopt legislative waiver for serious offenses. 77 Moreover, the total aboli-
tion of juvenile court jurisdiction over minors accused of criminal of-
fenses may be forthcoming 78 because of growing dissatisfaction with the
failure of the juvenile system to rehabilitate young offenders 79 and with
the lack of certain constitutional safeguards in the system.80 The
77 E.g., 29 A Judiciary-Courts Acts, § 301.2(8) (West 1983) (in addition to 16-and 17-year-
olds who were already subject to adult proceedings, the New York Act specifically targeted
13-, 14- and 15-year-olds who commit violent criminal acts for adjudication in the adult
system). See generalv BETWEEN Two WORLDS, supra note 35, at 81-82. The New York Act
provides a clear example of how the "get tough" attitude toward juvenile crime led a state to
turn to legislative waiver. New York's tougher stand on juvenile crime resulted in part from
its desire that these youths receive "longer sentences, be exposed to adult prisons and face
public trials instead of private proceedings" and from its dissatisfaction with the lenient and
meaningless dispositions previously imposed on juveniles. Levy, Violent Juveniles: The New
York Courts and the Constitution, 11 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 51, 52 (1979).
78 See Conrad, supra note 42; Note, supra note 44, at 104.
79 Many commentators believe that the system is ineffective at rehabilitation and has
become purely punitive. See, e.g., C. BARTOLLAS & S. MILLER, THE JUVENILE OFFENDER:
CONTROL, CORRECTION AND TREATMENT 419 (1978); Wizner & Keller, The Penal Model of
Juvenile Justice: Is Juvenile Court Delinquenc Jurisdiction Obsolete? 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1120, 1121
(1977); Note,sufpra note 44, at 103. These commentators claim that the juvenile justice system
does not address itself to the problems and needs of its dependents. They note that the juve-
nile courts prescribe treatments not suited to the problems from which youngsters suffer, do
little to determine exactly what caused an individual's delinquent behavior, and sometimes
provide no treatment at all. For example, minors often are placed on home probation, when
their unhealthy home situations are largely responsible for their delinquent behavior in the
first place. These critics also point out that juvenile correctional facilities are very inadequate
and that often juveniles are placed in adult jails and lockups because there is no room for
them in the overcrowded juvenile facilities. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, $3.8 Million Awarded to
RemoveJuvenile From Adult Jails, Lockups, 3 JUST. ASSISTANCE NEWS, May 1982, at 5 ("about
479,000 juveniles are detained each year in more than 16,000 adult jails and lockups in virtu-
ally every state"). Concluding that the juvenile courts are unwilling to address themselves to
the problems of juvenile offenders and that the resources currently available are inadequate
for the treatment of felony offenders, some commentators suggest that it is better to send these
juveniles to criminal courts, where at least they are afforded all the guarantees of due process.
See, e.g., Comment, supra note 58, at 179; see also in/ia note 80 and accompanying text.
80 The juvenile justice system denies juveniles certain constitutional guarantees enjoyed
by adults in the criminal courts, such as the right to jury. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403
U.S. 528, 545 (1971). Thejuvenile justice system has survived repeated legal attacks on such
grounds on the theory that "the state is merely acting as parens patriae for the youngster's
protection in the [same] way as it does in a guardianship matter and not accusing the child
with a view to punishment as it does in a prosecution for crime." Paulsen, supra note 33, at
549; see McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. at 545. But there is growing recognition that the
juvenile justice system is subjecting juveniles to institutionalization without providing ade-
quate treatment and care. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. Thus, many believe that
the juvenile is getting "the worst of both worlds." See, e.g., A. PLATT, supra note 16, at 176-92;
S. WHEELER & L. COTTRELL, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY-ITS PREVENTION AND CONTROL
31-36 (1966); FoxJuvenilejustice in America: PhilosophicalRefrms, 5 HUM. RTs. 63 (1975). The
Supreme Court began to be troubled by the situation as long ago as the 1960's:
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose of juvenile courts,
studies and critiques in recent years raise serious questions as to whether actual perform-
ance measures well enough against theoretical purposes to make tolerable the immunity
of the process from the reach of constitutional guarantees applicable to adults.
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courts8 I and the federal government 82 have made efforts to improve the
juvenile justice system. However, judicial decisions alone may be un-
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. at 555.
81 For example, the Supreme Court has imposed on the juvenile courts certain basic re-
quirements of due process. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. at 528-41 (imposed double jeopardy
prohibition); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (observance of standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt); In re. Gault, 387 U.S. at 31-58 (imposed procedural protections such as
right to counsel, right to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and privilege
against self-incrimination). But see McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. at 545 (no right to
jury).
Some lower courts have tried to force states to improve the resources and facilities avail-
able in their juvenile justice systems by holding that juveniles have a constitutional right to
treatment. See, e.g., Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974);
Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967); White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.C. 1954).
See generally Kittrie, Can the Right to Treatment Remedy the Ills of theJuvenile Process?, 57 GEO. L.J.
848 (1969); Renn, The Right to Treatment and theJuvenile, 19 CRIME & DELINQ. 477 (1973). The
idea of such a constitutional right was borrowed from the mental health area, where some
courts have held that when a state involuntarily commits a person to a mental institution in
order to cure his or her mental illness the person has a right to treatment. Without such
treatment, the deprivation of this person's freedom is unjustified and the patient must be
released. See, e.g., Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated, 422 U.S. 563
(1975); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451
(D.C. Cir. 1966); Stachulak v. Coughlin, 364 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Ill. 1973). See generaly Birn-
baum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A. J. 499 (1960). As applied to the juvenile justice area,
the theory is that because the juvenile justice system institutionalizes minors so that they can
be rehabilitated, juveniles have a right to rehabilitative treatment. However, this constitu-
tional right may have limited application in the juvenile justice area. It has been argued that
the theory behind the constitutional right to treatment is suited only to status offenders and
dependent minors, who, like the mental health patients, have not committed any crimes and
are thus institutionalized solely for rehabilitative reasons. Renn, supra, at 483; see also Morales
v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 998 (5th Cir. 1977). Juvenile law may have a dual purpose with
regard to minors who commit criminal acts: treatment and penal custody. In the case of
serious juvenile felons, the purpose of penal custody may outweigh completely the purpose of
treatment. See Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d at 998; Renn, supra, at 483.
82 For example, in 1974 Congress passed the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
Act (J.J.D.P.), which established programs and projects designed to improve the rehabilita-
tive resources and facilities of the juvenile justice system. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601-5751 (1976).
The Act provides for a dual method of treatment for young offenders: legal control (i.e.,
juvenile court) for youths who engage in serious crimes, and informal social control (i.e.,
family, school, church, and community services) for youths who engage in less serious crimes
and non-criminal behavior. See generally THE PREVENTION OF SERIOUS DELINQUENCY, supra
note 38, at 2. Under this new method, the juvenile courts should have more time and re-
sources available to handle serious offenders. Moreover, the J.J.D.P. Act of 1974 authorizes
both prevention and control of delinquency. 42 U.S.C. § 5602(b) (1976). It created the Na-
tional Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and mandated that the office
take steps to improve the juvenile justice system and to develop programs to prevent juvenile
delinquency. Id. at § 5611. The 1980 amendments to the Act authorized the Office to de-
velop programs focusing on serious and violent offenders. Id. at § 5601(8) (Supp. V 1981).
Particular attention is to be paid to prevention and rehabilitation. A few states and several
commentators have followed the federal government's lead and begun to pay increasing at-
tention to the rehabilitation of serious and violent offenders. See, e.g., Calhoun & Wayne, Can
the MassachusetlsJuvenile System Survive the Eighties? 27 CRIME & DELINQ. 522 (1981) (discusses
Massachusetts' program of community-based correction for serious juvenile offenders);
1983] CAPITAL PUNISHMENT FOR MINORS 1485
able to save its3 and the government's programs may be short-lived be-
cause of recent budget cuts.
8 4
That more minors will be sentenced to death also is indicated by
the growing willingness, at least on the part of some, to impose this sen-
tence on minors. More and more states are amending their death pen-
alty statutes to permit the imposition of death sentences on offenders
under age eighteen.85 That eighteen juvenile offenders are currently on
death row certainly demonstrates that sentencers are willing to impose
the penalty.86 All of these factors, along with the increasingly common
imposition of death sentences in general,8 7 strongly suggest that more
minors will receive capital sentences in the years ahead, unless there is
judicial recognition that the death penalty is unconstitutional when im-
posed on these very young offenders.
Coates, Deinstitutionalization and the Srious Juvenie Offender: Some Poliy Considerations, 27 CRIME
& DELINQ. 477 (1981).
The 1980 amendments to the JJ.D.P. Act also authorized the removal of juveniles from
adult jails and lock-ups. 42 U.S.C. § 5602(a)(8) (Supp. V 1981). The statute provides for
federal grants to be given to sites participating in the program. Currently, 51 states and
territories participate. During 1981, the number of juveniles in regular contact with adults
fell from 58,058 to 39,041. REPORT OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT AGENCIES,
supra note 75, at 23.
83 For example, even if the courts were to impose all the procedural guarantees of the
Constitution on the juvenile courts, the problem of inadequate treatment resources and facili-
ties would remain. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
84 Many of the programs created under the Federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act, see supra note 82 and accompanying text, were not slated to receive fiscal year
1983 funding. See REPORT OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT AGENCIES, supra note
75, at 28.
85 BETWEEN Two WORLDS, supra note 35, at 82. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103
(Supp. 1981) (changing the statute from one that prohibited the imposition of a death sen-
tence on an offender who was under 17 at the time of the crime to one with no age restric-
tions); see also State Crack Down on Young Criminals, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., February 1,
1982, at 6 (notes that though 27 states currently permit the execution of minors, the remain-
ing death penalty states are expected to follow suit in the years ahead).
86 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Indeed, a judge recently commented that
these death sentences are "a reflection of the mood of the country." Chicago Tribune, June
20, 1982, § 3, at 4, col. 1; cf State Crack Down on Young Criminals, supra note 85, at 6 (suggests
that sentences for juveniles will be more severe and the death penalty imposed on them with
greater frequency in the future).
87 The number of people on death row has been rising steadily for the last five years and
the death row population at present is the largest it has ever been since the national count
began in 1953. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN,
DEATH-Row PRISONERS 1 (1981); see a/so Andersen, supra note 2, at 28 (current death row
population is 200 more than a year ago and twice as many as in 1979); Gillers, Deciding Who
Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1980) (average of one person every three days currently is
added to death row population).
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III. A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS--EIGHTH AMENDMENT
CONSIDERATIONS
In recent years, minors have begun to challenge the constitutional-
ity of their death sentences.8 8 Though the constitutionality of capital
punishment for minors may be challenged on many grounds,8 9 the
ground primarily relied upon is that sentencing minors to death violates
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the eighth amendment.9 0
So far, all such eighth amendment challenges have failed. 91 However,
these prior eighth amendment attacks on capital punishment for minors
virtually have ignored the eighth amendment argument that is reviewed
in this Comment. 92 The argument examined herein is that sentencing
88 See, e.g., State v. Valencia, 124 Ariz. 139, 602 P.2d 807 (1979) (en banc); Eddings v.
State, 616 P.2d 1159 (Okla. Grim. App. 1980), rev'don othergrounds, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); see
also Riley, Ky. Court: Age No Bar to Execution ofJuvenile, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 10, 1983, at 5.
89 For example, one could challenge the constitutionality of the death penalty in general.
But only Justices Marshall and Brennan have taken the position that the death penalty is
unconstitutional per se. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 314 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 257 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring). Moreover, as this Comment will show, such an attack on the death
penalty in general is not necessary.
One also could challenge capital punishment for minors by arguing that juveniles have a
constitutional right to treatment. As noted earlier, such a right is based on the theory that
because the juvenile justice system institutionalizes minors for the purpose of rehabilitation,
juveniles have a right to treatment. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. If such a right
were held to exist, imposition of the death penalty would be unconstitutional. However, the
Supreme Court has not yet recognized such a right. And it is unlikely to do so, at least in
regard to those juveniles who have committed serious felonies, as such juveniles are institu-
tionalized not merely for the purpose of rehabilitation, but also for the purpose of penal
custody. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. It is probably for this very reason that no
one has yet challenged capital punishment for juveniles on the ground that these minors, who
have committed capital crimes, have a constitutional right to treatment.
90 See cases cited supra note 88.
91 The state courts have dismissed such challenges with little comment. See, e.g., State v.
Valencia, 124 Ariz. at 141, 602 P.2d at 809; Eddings v. State, 616 P.2d at 1166-67. Though
the Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue, the dissenting opinion in Eddings v.
Oklahoma suggests that at least four of the Justices are prepared to reject an eighth amend-
ment argument. 455 U.S. at 128 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Supreme Court had granted
certiorari in Eddings on the question of whether capital punishment for minors violates the
eighth amendment. 450 U.S. 1040 (1981). The Court did not decide the issue, however, as it
was able to reverse the juvenile defendant's death sentence on other grounds. 455 U.S. at 112-
17. See tupra note 8 and accompanying text. In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger,
who was joined by Justices White, Blackmun and Rehnquist, objected to the grounds on
which the majority reversed Eddings' sentence. 455 U.S. at 120-28. Although he did not
elaborate on the certiorari issue regarding the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty
on minors, at the conclusion of his dissent Chief Justice Burger stated that if it were up to him
he would "decide the sole issue on which we granted certiorari and affm the judgment." Id. at
128 (emphasis added). The lower appellate court had upheld Eddings' death sentence and
ruled that capital punishment for minors was constitutional. Eddings v. State, 616 P.2d at
1166-67.
92 In Eddings v. State, 616 P.2d 1159 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980), rev'don other grounds, 455
U.S. 104 (1982), for example, the petitioner relied primarily on the argument that capital
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT FOR MINORS
minors to death violates the excessiveness strand 93 of the Cruel and Un-
usual Punishment Clause. Such an argument deserves greater attention;
for, as will be shown, sentencing minors to death is excessive punishment
and thus violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the
eighth amendment.
94
A. THE EXCESSIVENESS STRAND OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The eighth amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment
inflicted. '95 Since the amendment was added to the Constitution in
1791, the Supreme Court has struggled to ascertain the meaning of its
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.96 Though the Court never has
provided a precise definition,97 it has articulated several principles in-
herent in the clause.98 One of the principles that is relevant in analyzing
the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty on minors99 is that a
punishment for minors violates the eighth amendment because it is unacceptable to contem-
porary society. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 18-59; see also infra note 99 and accom-
panying text.
93 See infra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
94 Certain Supreme Court Justices are likely to be particularly sympathetic to an exces-
siveness argument such as the one described in this Comment. For example, Justice Powell
might be sympathetic, as he repeatedly asserted in his majority opinion in Eddings that minors
are less mature and less responsible than are adults. See 455 U.S. at 115-16. Of course, Jus-
tices Brennan and Marshall will be supportive of an excessiveness argument, as they have
taken the position that a death sentence is excessive punishment in all cases. See Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 314
(1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
95 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The eighth amendment applies to the states through the
Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666
(1962).
96 See generally L. BERKSON, THE CONCEPT OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
(1975); Granucci, 'Wor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inftaed": The Oiginal Meaning, 57 CALIF.
L. REV. 839 (1969); Radin, The.jurisprudence ofDeath: Evolving Standards for the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 989 (1978); Wheeler, Toward a Theog o(Limited Pnish-
ment: An Examination ofthe Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REv. 838 (1972).
97 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958) ("[t]he exact scope of the constitutional
phrase 'cruel and unusual' has not been detailed by this Court"); see also Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. at 376 (Burger, CJ., dissenting); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910);
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1879).
98 First, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause forbids punishments that are inher-
ently cruel, inhuman, or barbarous. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890); Wilkerson v.
Utah, 99 U.S. at 136. Second, it places substantive limits on what can be made criminal and
punished as such. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (cannot punish individuals
because of their status or condition). Third, it forbids punishments that are not acceptable to
contemporary society. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 173. But see infia note 99 and accompa-
nying text. Fourth, it prohibits excessive punishment. Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368,
3372 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. at 173.
99 Most of the other principles are not relevant to this issue. For example, the Supreme
Court has held that the death penalty is not inherently cruel. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at
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punishment must not be excessive. 100 A punishment is excessive if it is
disproportionate to the crime 0 or if it makes no measurable contribu-
tion to acceptable goals of punishment. 10 2 The death penalty in general
has passed both tests.'0 3 When applied to minors, however, the death
penalty is disproportionate10 4 and fails to make a measurable contribu-
tion to acceptable goals of punishment.105
B. DISPROPORTIONALITY
. The Nature of the Standard
A punishment is disproportionate if it is more punishment than the
offender deserves.10 6 The Supreme Court has developed a two-step
178. Also, the limitations of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause on what may be
made criminal and punished as such are entirely irrelevant to the inquiry of this Comment.
There is, however, one principle that will not be discussed in detail in this Comment that
is relevant to the issue at hand; namely, that a punishment must not be unacceptable to
contemporary society, or, as is sometimes said, that it must not offend society's "standards of
decency." See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 179. In determining whether a punishment is
acceptable to contemporary society, the Court is to look at "objective" indicia such as the
history of the particular punishment, current legislation, and jury verdicts. Id. at 176-82.
Based on such objective indicia, the Supreme Court has held that the death penalty, in gen-
eral, is not unacceptable to contemporary society. Id. However, society may take quite a
different view toward capital punishment when it is applied to children and adolescents. See
Vidmar & Ellsworth, Public Opinion andthe Death Penalty, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1245, 1250 (1974)
(citing Erskine, The Polls.: Capital Punishmfnt, 34 PUB. OPINION Q. 290, 297 (1970)) (a 1965
Gallup survey found that while 45% of respondents supported capital punishment for mur-
der, only 23% favored it for persons under 21). Indeed, this is the position commonly taken
by those who maintain that capital punishment for minors is "cruel and unusual" punish-
ment. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 18-59; Gwin, supra note 5.
It is doubtful, however, that the "standards of decency" test actually adds very much to
an analysis of the constitutionality of imposing death sentences on minors. First, the objective
indicia do not demonstrate conclusively whether capital punishment for adolescents is accept-
able to Americans. See infra note 108 and accompanying text. Second, it is unlikely that the
Supreme Court any longer considers the "standards of decency" test an independent eighth
amendment principle, as it did when the test was formally articulated in Gregg. In the Court's
most recent decisions, contemporary attitude toward a particular punishment has been rele-
gated to the role of merely a factor to be considered in determining whether a penalty is
proportionate under the eighth amendment's excessiveness standard. See infra notes 107-09
and accompanying text. Thus, even if the evidence showed that society opposed capital pun-
ishment for minors, it is not likely that this by itself would render it unconstitutional. See
generall.y Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Processfor Death, 53 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1143, 1147 n.11 (1980).
100 Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 3372; Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 392; Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. at 173. This is also known as the "dignity of man" principle. See id. at 173,
182; see also Liebman & Shepard, supra note 70, at 763; The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90
HARv. L. REV. 58, 64-65 (1976).
101 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 592; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 173.
102 Id.
103 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 176-87.
104 See infra notes 106-90 and accompanying text.
105 See infra notes 191-259 and accompanying text.
106 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 592.
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analysis for determining whether a punishment is disproportionate. The
first step is to examine the history of the punishment, current legislation,
and jury sentences to determine whether the imposition of the punish-
ment for a particular crime or on a particular class of offenders is ac-
ceptable to contemporary society.' 0 7 Unfortunately, an examination of
these factors does not indicate whether capital punishment for minors is
acceptable. 108 But even if it did, this would not be determinative of the
issue. The Court has stated repeatedly that "in the end our own judg-
ment must be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the
[punishment] under the eighth amendment."' 0 9 This is the second, and
107 See Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 3372; Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 592.
108 A review of the history of capital punishment for minors suggests that society has had a
very ambivalent attitude toward sentencing these young offenders to death. Although the
United States adopted a rehabilitative, rather than penal, approach to juvenile crime over a
century ago, some juvenile offenders always have been and continue to be sentenced to death.
See supra notes 3, 22, 34 and accompanying text.
Current legislation indicates that society still is undecided about the acceptability of
capital punishment for minors. Though most death penalty states permit capital punishment
for minors, virtually all of them specifically designate youth as a mitigating circumstance in
their death penalty statutes. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text. Further, while all
states have juvenile court systems, they also have mechanisms by which juveniles can be
transferred to criminal courts. See supra notes 36, 43 and accompanying text.
Jury sentencing decisions, at least at the present time, shed little light on the matter
because the information about the ages of persons sentenced to death that has been collected
systematically does not distinguish between minors and adults sentenced to death. For exam-
ple, the annual reports on capital punishment prepared by the Department of Justice prior to
1974 grouped together all offenders "under 21." See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LAW EN-
FORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS BULLETIN,
No. SD-NPS-CP-2, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1973, at 26, Table 7 (March 1975). Since 1974,
the lowest age grouping reported for all offenders has been "under 20 years." See, e.g., U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STANDARDS, NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS BUL-
LETIN, NCJ-70945, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1979, at 72, Table 29 (Dec. 1980). Moreover, the
information about persons sentenced to death does not distinguish between those sentenced
by juries and those sentenced byjudges. If one were to rely on this information, however, one
would probably conclude that sentencers, in general, are far more reluctant to impose the
death penalty on offenders under 20 than they are on those over 20. See id. (of the 567 offend-
ers under sentence of death as of December 31, 1979, 11 were in the under 20 category; 145
were in the 20- to 24-year-old category and 151 were in the age category from 25 to 29 years).
This conclusion also is supported by the fact that only 18 of the 1,137 inmates currently on
death row are juvenile offenders. See supra notes 2, 3 and accompanying text. Yet, these low
numbers could be attributable to the fact that a significantly smaller percentage of minors
than adults commit capital crimes. See Adams, The Child Who Murders: A Review of Theory and
Research, 1 CRIM. JUST. & BEH. 51 (1974) (the homicide rate for those under 18 is lower than
for every other age group except males over age 66); BETWEEN Two WORLDS, supra note 35,
at 4 (350,529 adults were arrested for violent crimes such as murder, forcible rape, robbery
and aggravated assault in 1978; only 95,593 juveniles were arrested for such crimes); cf. THE
PREVENTION OF SERIOUS DELINQUENCY, supra note 38, at ix, 18 ("small percentage of all
juvenile offenders account for a majority of serious offenses; serious crime for which juveniles
least arrested is murder"). Further, the very fact that 18 juvenile offenders are on death row
indicates that there is a willingness, at least on the part of some, to sentence minors to death.
See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
109 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 597; see airo Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 3376 (even
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crucial, step in the analysis. It is thus on this step that this Comment
focuses.
The Court, in exercising its own judgment, has looked to the culpa-
bility of the offender to determine whether the punishment is deserved
and therefore proportionate. 110 An actor's culpability is a factor of both
the severity of the harm caused and the actor's degree of responsibility
for the harm.1 I As the death penalty is the harshest punishment Amer-
ican society imposes, it will be deserved, and thus proportionate, only
when the offenders are among the most culpable actors; that is, when
their acts have caused the most harm and the offenders are among the
most responsible for the harm. Until recently, however, the Supreme
Court has focused primarily on the harm caused in determining the pro-
portionality of the punishment to the crime. 1 2 Its analysis has been
based on a comparison of the consequences of the punishment for the
offender with the consequences of the crime for the victim. In Coker v.
Georgia, ' 13 for example, the Court held that the death penalty always is
disproportionate to the crime of rape because, though rapists violate the
"personal integrity and autonomy" of their victims, 14 they do not take
their victims' lives.1 5 Using such an analysis, the Court also has held
that when someone kills another it cannot be said that death isper se a
disproportionate penalty.1 6 Under such a test, which only looks to the
harm done, capital punishment for minors who kill their victims is not a
disproportionate penalty: the victims are dead, whether adults or mi-
nors commit the offense.
The Court always has recognized the possibility, however, that it
would consider the responsibility of the offender for the harm done in its
though the evidence indicated that the punishment was unacceptable to contemporary soci-
ety, the Court stated that this was not determinative: "Although the judgments of legisla-
tures, juries and prosecutors weigh heavily in the balance, it is for us ultimately to judge
whether the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the. . . penalty on one such as En-
mund"); Note, Eighth Amendment-The Death Penaly and Vicarious Felony Murder. Nontriggerman
May Not Be Executed Absent a Fianding of an Intent to Kill, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1553,
1563-64 (1983). At one time, the Court did suggest that a punishment would be unconstitu-
tional if it was unacceptable to contemporary society. See supra note 99 and accompanying
text. As indicated, however, in recent decisions contemporary attitude has been treated as
merely a factor to be considered.
110 See Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 3377; Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 597-600.
111 R. NoZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL ExPLANATIONS 363 (1981); A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUs-
TICE 69 (1976).
112 See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 266; Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)
(denationalization disproportionate to crime of desertion for one day); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 381 (1910) (hard labor and chains for 12 years disproportionate to crime
of record falsification).
113 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
114 Id. at 597.
115 Id. at 597-600.
116 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 187.
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disproportionality analysis. In Woodson v. North Carolina,I" 7 for example,
the Court reserved the question of whether the punishment of death is
disproportionate for a murderer acting under duress." 8 In the recent
capital punishment case of Enmund v. Florida,119 the Court finally did
extend its analysis to include an examination of whether the punish-
ment is proportionate in light of the offender's responsibility. In En-
mund, the Court held that capital punishment for felony murderers120 is
disproportionate and therefore unconstitutional. 12 1 That the Court ex-
tended its earlier harm-based analysis is clear: Enmund was convicted of
first-degree murder 22 and two people were dead because of his partici-
pation in a felony.' 23 However, the Court explained:
The focus must be on [the defendant's] culpability, not on that of [his ac-
complices] who [actually] shot the victims, for we insist on 'individualized
consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing the death sen-
tence' . . . which means that we focus on 'relevant facets of the character
and record of the individual offender.'. . . Enmund did not kill or intend
to kill and thus his culpability is plainly different from that of the robbers
who killed; yet the state treated them alike .... 124
As Enmund's culpability could not be distinguished from that of
his accomplices on the basis of the harm done, the Court's conclusion
must rest on its perception of Enmund's responsibility for the harm.
25
117 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
118 Id. at 305 n.40. In Woodson, the Court held that the North Carolina mandatory death
penalty statute was unconstitutional. See infra note 239 and accompanying text. As the Court
was able to overturn the petitioner's death sentence on that ground, it did not reach the
disproportionality question.
119 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982).
120 At early common law, one whose conduct brought about an unintended death in the
commission or attempted commission of a felony was guilty of murder, even though the felon
did not perform the actual killing. Today, many states retain the rule of felony murder,
although in statutory form. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scotrr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAWV
545-61 (1972).
121 102 S. Ct. at 3377.
122 Id. at 3370. During the course of a robbery in which Enmund was involved, his accom-
plices shot and killed two people. Under Florida law, the killing of a human being while
engaged in the perpetration of or in the attempt to perpetrate the offense of robbery is murder
in the first degree, even though there is no premeditated design or intent to kill. The only
requirements are that the defendant actually was present, actively aiding and abetting the
robbery or attempted robbery, and that the unlawful killing occurred in the perpetration or
attempted perpetration of the robbery. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1)(a) (West 1976); see
also Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 3370 (quoting Florida trial court). See generally W.
LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 120, at 555-56. Because Enmund was constructively present,
aiding and abetting the crime of robbery, he was held responsible under the felony murder
rule for the acts of his accomplices. Enmund v. State, 399 So. 2d 1362, 1370 (Fla. 1981), reo'd,
458 U.S. 782 (1982).
123 102 S. Ct. at 3370.
124 Id. at 3377 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978), and Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 208, 304 (1976)).
125 See Note, supra note 109, at 1564.
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Although Enmund facilitated the crime, his responsibility for the deaths
was not as great as that of his accomplices who intended the deaths and
actually pulled the trigger. Felony murderers therefore never could be as
deserving of the death penalty as other murderers upon whom death
sentences are imposed.
Enmund obviously is distinguishable from the case of a minor who
intentionally kills another. The thrust of Enmund, however, is a focus on
individuals and their responsibility for the harms done, rather than on
the crimes for which the offenders were convicted or the consequences to
the victims.126 Thus, if it can be established that minors who intention-
ally kill are always less responsible for the harm than adults who inten-
tionally kill, then minors never will be as culpable as adults, and the
state never may impose its maximum penalty, death, on minors: it may
not treat minors and adults 12 7 alike.1 28 And, as will be shown, minors
are in all cases less responsible than adults.
2. The Responsibility of Minors who are in the Juvenile Justice System
While minors are in the juvenile justice system, they are viewed and
treated as being less responsible than adults. Most contemporary com-
mentators observe that there is a separate justice system for minors not
only so that young offenders can be rehabilitated, but also because mi-
nors do not deserve to be punished as severely as adults. 29 These com-
mentators do not posit that minors lack all responsibility for their
criminal acts but rather that they are never as responsible for their
crimes as adults are for theirs.
30
There are several reasons why minors are less responsible, and thus
126 See id.
127 For the purposes of this Comment, an "adult" is an average person over 18 years of age.
The term does not include, for example, the mentally retarded, the mentally ill, or those with
diminished capacity.
128 This argument applies with equal force to any penalty that is the maximum the state
inflicts for a particular crime. For example, in non-death penalty states, life without parole
may be an excessive punishment when imposed on the juvenile murderer.
129 One commentator explains:
The very existence of a dual criminal justice system is evidence of a two-fold societal
judgment that: children do not bear the same degree of responsibility for their antisocial
behavior as adults and therefore should not be subject to the harsh penalties of criminal
trial and penal incarceration; and juvenile delinquents are, by virtue of their youth, re-
sponsive to rehabilitative treatment.
S. Fox, THE JUVENILE COURT: ITS CONTEXT, PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES 11-13
(1967); see also PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, THE COMMISSION
ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVE-
NILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 41 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE
REPORT].
130 See, e.g., TASK FORCE REPORT,SUpra note 129, at 47 ("the juvenile justice system, while
holding minors responsible for their misconduct,. . . acknowledges that the level ofjuvenile
responsibility is lower than for adults"); S. Fox, supra note 129, at 11-13.
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less culpable, than their elders.' 31 First, minors are less mature than
adults. Both legal studies and the courts have recognized that minors are
less mature in their ability to make sound judgments. 132 Psychological
research reveals that minors are less mature in terms of their moral de-
velopment as well.'
33
Second, minors are less responsible because they are less able to
control their conduct and to recognize the consequences of their acts
than are adults. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that "during
the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the
experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices
that could be detrimental to them."'1 34 That our society also recognizes
this fact is evidenced by those laws that prohibit minors from buying
alcohol 135 and cigarettes136 and from marrying without the consent of
their parents.137 Legal and sociological studies also support the
131 As will be shown, these reasons apply with equal force to minors who have been trans-
ferred to criminal courts. See infra notes 156-79 and accompanying text.
132 E.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) ("Most children, even in adolescence,
simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions"); TASK FORCE
1978, supra note 76, at 7 ("it is. . .unrealistic to treat young offenders as if they have fully
mature judgment and control'); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982);
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948).
133 Psychologists generally agree that by the time a person reaches age 15 or 16, he or she
usually has achieved significant cognitive ability and is able to deal with abstract concepts
and ideas. See, e.g., J. PJAGor, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (1932). However, a
person's ability to think abstractly and to engage in moral judgment continues to develop
further during late adolescence and early adulthood. See E. A. PEEL, THE NATURE OF ADO-
LESCENT JUDGMENT 131-34 (1971); M. RUTTER, CHANGING YOUTH IN A CHANGING SOCI-
ETY 83 (1980). A considerable body of research demonstrates that a person's ability to think
in moral terms and to engage in moral judgments develops significantly during middle and
late adolescence, reaching a plateau only after leaving school or reaching early adulthood.
See, e.g., G. MANASTER, ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT AND THE LIFE TASKS (1977);
Kohlberg, Development of Moral Character and Moral Ideology, in REVIEW OF CHILD DEVELOP-
MENT RESEARCH 404-05 (M. Hoffman & L. Hoffman eds. 1964); Rest, Davison & Robbins,
Age Trends injudging Moral Issues: A Review of Cross-Sectional Studies of the Defining Issues Test, 49
CHILD DEv. 263 (1978).
Research also shows that the ability to make moral judgments depends, at least in part,
on the broader factor of social experience. Most adolescents simply do not have the breadth
and depth of experience essential to making sound value judgments. See M. RUTTER, supra,
at 238; Kohlberg, supra, at 404-05. This appears to be particularly true of adolescents who
engage in delinquent behavior. A recent study suggests that delinquent minors have a partic-
ularly low moral maturity level. The mean moral maturity level of delinquents ages 15 to 17
was found to be that of the average 10- to 12-year-old. See Scharf, Law and the Child's Evolving
Legal Conscience, in ADVANCES IN LAW AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT 17 (R. Sprague ed. 1982).
'34 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. at 635; see also Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962).
135 E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-241 (West Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 562.11
(West Supp. 1983).
136 Eg., CAL. PENAL CODE § 308 (West Supp. 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.685 (West
Supp. 1983).
'37 Eg., ALA. CODE § 30-1-5 (1975); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4101 (West 1983); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 765.02 (West Supp. 1982).
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Supreme Court's observation. For example, a Presidential committee
reporting on youth crime has concluded that
adolescents, particularly in the early and middle teen years, are more vul-
nerable, more impulsive, and less self-disciplined than adults. Crimes com-
mitted by youths may be just as harmful to victims as those committed by
older persons, but they deserve less punishment because adolescents have
less capacity to control their conduct and to think in long-range terms than
adults.
138
The responsibility of minors also is diminished because they are in a
developmental stage characterized by defiance of authority and condu-
cive to criminal activity. It has been noted, for example, that
[t]he American adolescent, struggling with the biological and psychologi-
cal pressures of youth, seeks status and reassurance in the company of his
peers. Rebellion against parental authority and restrictions is combined
with pressure to conform to the expectations of other adolescents. The
teen years are a period of experiment, risk taking and bravado. Some
criminal activity is part of the patterns of almost all youth subcultures.
139
That the developmental period of adolescence and the turmoil it pro-
duces for minors play a part in youth crime further is evidenced by
crime statistics, which show a strong correlation between age and crimi-
nal activity with the rates of many kinds of criminality peaking in mid-
adolescence. 140 Statistics show that as people pass from the turbulent
years of adolescence to the calmer period of the early twenties, they
commit fewer offenses, whether or not they were apprehended or partic-
138 TASK FORCE 1978, supra note 76, at 7. There also is a considerable body of research
showing that minors do not have the breadth and depth of experience essential to under-
standing the long-range consequences of their decisions. See, e.g., M. RUTTER, supra note 133,
at 238; Kohlberg, supra note 133, at 404-05; Lewis, A Comparison ofMinorsr'andAduts'Pregnancy
Decisions, 50 Am. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 446 (1980) (minors making abortion decisions are
less likely than adults to consider the effects of having a child on the quality of their lives).
139 TASK FORCE 1978, supra note 76, at 3; see also THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note
75, at 55 (Presidential Commission noted that perhaps 90% of all young persons have com-
mitted at least one act for which they could have been brought before the juvenile court);
TASK FORCE 1978, supra note 76, at 7 ("[m]any forms of youth crime are a product of the
special pressures and vulnerability of adolescence"); M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO & T. SELLIN,
DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT (1972); cf. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948)
(Court acknowledges that the teen years are "the period of great instability which the crisis of
adolescence produces"). Congress also has recognized that the teen years are a time when
special factors operate to produce criminal behavior. It was primarily for this reason that it
enacted the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1976 & Supp. V 1981),
which authorizes federal courts to give special consideration to placing offenders in this age
bracket into rehabilitative programs rather than prisons. See H.R. REP. No. 2679, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 2-3 (1950); see also Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974).
140 See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES: 1978, at 194-96 (1979); Zimring, American Youth Violence.- Issues and Trends, in
CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 67 (N. Morris & M. Tonry eds.
1979).
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ipated in a rehabilitation program.14 '
Of course, some minors may be exceptionally mature, 142 fully capa-
ble of controlling their conduct and realizing the consequences of their
acts, and capable of withstanding the special pressures of adolescence.
Yet, there is still a reason why even these minors are less responsible
than adults for their crimes. Minors are always less responsible because
their crimes are never their fault alone. Society shares responsibility for
their crimes, 4 3 and it bears a greater responsibility for the crimes of
minors than for those of adults. Legal and sociological studies reveal
that juvenile crime often results from the failure of the juvenile's family
to provide proper guidance and attention. The main characteristic
shared by juveniles who commit serious crimes is membership in a fam-
ily that provides inadequate supervision and in which there are con-
flicts, disharmony, and poor parent-child relationships.' 4 4 Moreover,
141 Se OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, ASSESSING THE RELATIONSHIP OF ADULT CRIMINAL CAREERS TO JUVENILE CA-
REERS: A SUMMARY 4 (1982) [hereinafter cited as THE RELATIONSHIP OF ADULT CRIMINAL
CAREERS TO JUVENILE CAREERS]; THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 75, at 55-56.
142 It must be admitted that while the Supreme Court has recognized that most minors are
less mature than adults, it also has noted that there may be exceptions. In regard to the
admissibility of juvenile confessions, for example, the Court has adopted a "totality of the
circumstances" test to determine whether the minor knowingly and intelligently waived his or
her fifth amendment right and voluntarily consented to interrogation. See Fare v. Michael
C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979). Instead of assuming that all minors are too immature to make such a
decision, the Court considers the age, actual maturity, family environment, education, and
emotional and mental stability of each minor to determine his or her particular ability to
make an informed choice. Moreover, in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opin-
ion), the Supreme Court held that states may not blanketly require parental consent in order
for a minor to have an abortion. Rather, the states must provide a minor the opportunity to
demonstrate that she is sufficiently mature and informed to make an abortion decision with-
out parental guidance.
143 TASK FORCE 1978, supra note 76, at 7 (concluding that minors deserve less punishment
than adults: "youth crime as such is not exclusively the offender's fault; offenses by the young
also represent a failure of family, school and social system, which share responsibility for the
development of America's youth"); S. WHEELER & L. COTTRELL, JUVENILE DELIN-
QUENCY-ITS PREVENTION AND CONTROL 6 (1966) (youth crime is the result of society's
failure to provide the conditions, services and experiences that enable a person to participate
successfully in American life).
144 See THE PREVENTION OF SERIOUS DELINQUENCY, supra note 38, at 24. The classic
formula of juvenile delinquency put forth by the President's Commission on Law Enforce-
ment and the Administration of Justice also indicates the substantial role the family plays in
juvenile crime:
He is 15 or 16 years old . . . one of numerous children-perhaps representing several
different fathers--who live with their mother in a home that the sociologists call female-
centered. It may be broken; it may never have had a resident father . . . . He may
never have known a grownup man well enough to identify with him or imagine emulat-
ing him. From the adults and older children in charge of him he has had leniency,
sternness, affection, perhaps indifference, in erratic and unpredictable succession. All his
life he has had considerable independence, and by now his mother has little control over
his comings and goings, little way of knowing what he is up to until a policeman brings
him home or a summons from court comes in the mail.
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research has validated the connection between a violent family environ-
ment and adolescent violent crime. 145 Numerous lawmakers also have
recognized that parents share in the responsibility for the crimes and
other wrongful acts committed by their children. For example, many
municipalities have enacted ordinances that make parents liable for the
criminal acts of their children. 146
Juvenile crime also results from the failure of the school and social
systems to counteract the negative influences to which the minor was
exposed at home or in the community. A recent study reports that
juveniles who commit serious crimes almost always come from "commu-
nities with the worst delinquency and gang problems and with dimin-
ished capacity of social service agencies and of the traditional
institutions . . . school, church, and the law, to help keep these minors
out of trouble."'
147
Sociological theories on the causes of juvenile crime support the
conclusion that society must share responsibility for a juvenile's offense.
For example, the control theory attributes the cause of delinquency to a
failure of the family, school, and community to socialize and control the
youth. 48  The cultural deviance theory maintains that the cause of
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 75, at 60.
145 For example, a recent study, to be published in a forthcoming issue of The American
Journal ofPsychiatr, suggests that the violent criminal behavior of adolescents is linked to the
effects of abuse and violence in their families. See Collins, The Violent Child: Some Patterns
Emerge, New York Times, Sept. 27, 1982, § B (Style), at 10; see also K. MENNINGER, THE
CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 214-15 (1966); McCord, McCord & Howard, Family Interaction as
Antecedent to the Direction of Male Aggressiveness, 66 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 239
(1963); Note, supra note 44, at 103.
146 In Deerfield, Illinois, for instance, a 1975 parental responsibility ordinance makes par-
ents liable for failing to prevent their children from committing crimes and violating local
laws. Parents may be fined up to $500 for not controlling their children's behavior. Deerfield,
Ill., CODE § 15-S-64 (1975). In Naperville, Illinois, a vandalism ordinance requires that par-
ents or legal guardians make restitution to victims for the vandalism of their children. Naper-
ville, Ill., CODE § 24.031 (1978). See generally F. LUDWIG, YOUTH AND THE LAW 131-67
(1955); Lipinski, A Growing Movement: Making Parents Pay When Kids are Bad, Chicago Tribune,
Sept. 26, 1982, § 12 (Tempo), at 1.
147 THE PREVENTION OF SERIOUS DELINQUENCY, supra note 38, at 25; see also TASK
FORCE 1978, supra note 76, at 7.
148 The basic premise of this theory is that "social behavior requires socialization." G.
NETTLER, EXPLAINING CRIME 217 (1974) (emphasis in original). In other words, people be-
come social (moral) to a greater or lesser degree through various socialization processes ad-
ministered by the family, the schools, and the community. Proper socialization leads to
conformity. Improper socialization leads to nonconformity, of which juvenile delinquency is
one of the consequences. Under this theory, delinquent behavior occurs because the social
process of making the youth moral has been interrupted by uncaring parents, schools, and
communities and by delinquent associates. Youngsters who do not develop a bond to the
conventional order feel no moral obligation to conform. Thus, they are free to engage in
criminal behavior; special delinquent motivation is unnecessary to account for their behav-
ior-they do not know how to act any other way. See generally T. HIRSCHI, CAUSES OF DELIN-
QUENCY (1969); F. NYE, FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS AND DELINQUENT BEHAVIOR (1958); W.
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youth crime is the existence of deviant subcultures within our society
and of unconventional aspects of the dominant culture.
149
Of course, society may be at fault, to some degree, for adult crime
as well. But here again the distinction between minors and adults is
clear: society may be blamed for youth crime far more than it may be
for the crimes of adults. Adults have more freedom to leave the turbu-
lent family or neighborhood environment that contributed to their
criminal behavior'5 0 than do minors. 15 1 Moreover, adults have had a
RECKLESS, THE CRIME PROBLEM (3d ed. 1961); Reiss, Delinquency as the Failure of Personaland
Social Controls, 16 AM. Soc. REV. 196 (1951); Weiss, Comparative Anal sis of Social Control Theo-
tes v/Delinquency-The Breakdown of Adequate Social Controls, in 1 NATIONAL TASK FORCE TO
DEVELOP STANDARDS AND GOALS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION,
PREVENTING DELINQUENCY, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DELINQUENCY PREVENTION
PROGRAMS (1977).
149 The cultural deviance theory proposes that juvenile delinquency is a result of a desire
to conform to cultural values that are in conflict with those of the conventional moral order.
Under this theory, delinquent behavior is caused by proper socialization within a "deviant"
social group or culture. See generally C. SHAW & H. MCKAY, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND
URBAN AREAS (1942); E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY, CRIMINOLOGY (8th ed. 1970); Burgess
& Akers, A DifferentialAssociation-Reinforement Theov of Criminal Behavior, 14 Soc. PROBS. 128
(1966).
Different versions of the cultural deviance theory focus on different kinds of deviant cul-
ture. For example, Walter Miller's version of the theory focuses on lower class culture. He
has found that certain lower class cultural values are not only in conflict with, but are anti-
thetical to, dominant middle class values. Therefore, those individuals who conform to lower
class culture undergo a normal socialization, but almost automatically become deviant in
relation to legal and general community standards. See Miller, The Impact of Community Group
Work Program on Delinquent Comer Groups, 31 SOC. SERV. REV. 390 (1957).
Marvin Wolfgang and Franco Ferracuti have focused on what they call the "subculture
of violence." They define this subculture as a set of values, attitudes, beliefs and behavior
patterns that is shared in high population density urban areas and supports the use of physi-
cal aggression and violence as a form of interaction and a way to solve problems. This subcul-
ture is generated and sustained in the lower class, where violent behavior is both tolerated
and prescribed, from childrearing practices to street murders. The value system of those af-
fected by this subculture calls for quick resort to aggression at relatively weak provocation.
See M. WOLFGANG & F. FERRACUTI, THE SUBCULTURE OF VIOLENCE: TOWARDS AN INTE-
GRATED THEORY IN CRIMINOLOGY (1967). Moreover, the subculture of violence is "transmit-
ted" from generation to generation-it is learned behavior that is normal within that cultural
environment. In fact, it has functional, adaptive survival value for those who live in the
communities where the subculture of violence is influential.
Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin, who have studied "delinquent subculture," have
found that different types of delinquency are generated in different types of communities.
The type of delinquency depends on the extent to which the illegitimate opportunity struc-
ture has "integrated" age levels of offenders and carriers of conventional and criminal values
in the community. Delinquent gangs and subcultures emerge in communities where the ille-
gitimate opportunity structure is organized for involvement in and maintenance of criminal
activities. This tradition of crime is passed on to younger generations and new residents. See
R. CLOWARD & L. OHLIN, DELINQUENCY AND OPPORTUNITY (1960).
150 Though adults may not have the resources to leave, they, at least, have the legal right
to do so. See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
151 Generally, the law requires that minors remain in the custody of their parents or legal
guardians until they reach the age of majority. A. SUSSMAN, supra note 37, at 15-23. And, in
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greater opportunity, simply by virtue of time, to outgrow the negative
experiences of their youth and to learn appropriate behavior.
152 Mi-
nors, on the other hand, are in the midst of experiencing the negative
influences of their families or communities; they have not had the
chance to change. For this very reason, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that evidence of a turbulent childhood and of beatings by a harsh
father is always "particularly relevant" in determining the appropriate
punishment for a minor, whereas such evidence may be unimportant in
arriving at the appropriate penalty for an adult.1 53 Still another reason
why society shares a greater responsibility for youth crime is that adoles-
cents are more impressionable than adults. 5 4 Thus, people are more
likely to be affected by those negative influences they encounter during
their youth than those encountered as adults. That society recognizes
this is evidenced by the existence of laws that punish adults who "con-
tribute to the delinquency of minors."
155
3. Transfer and the Responsibility of Minors
As has been shown, minors, in general, are less responsible than
adults. The inquiry into juvenile responsibility is far from over, how-
ever. Although one of the reasons for having a juvenile justice system is
that minors, for the reasons discussed above, are less responsible than are
their elders, the fact remains that virtually every state permits the trans-
fer of minors to criminal court. 156 The specific question of whether
transfer to criminal court indicates that some minors, at least those
transferred, are as responsible as adults therefore must be examined.
The existence of the mechanism of transfer does not indicate, by
fact, the juvenile courts often place juveniles on home probation, when their unhealthy home
situation is largely responsible for their delinquent behavior in the first place. See Note, supra
note 44, at 103.
152 Studies show that delinquent behavior tends to decline when people reach the age of
majority and are able to quit school, leave home and strike out on their own. See U.S. Dep't
of Justice, 3 JusT. ASSISTANCE NEWS, Sept. 1982, at 14; THE RELATIONSHIP OF ADULT
CRIMINAL CAREERS TO JUVENILE CAREERS, supra note 141, at 10; see also supra note 138 and
accompanying text.
153 See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. at 115.
154 See Note, supra note 44, at 101; Comment, supra note 58, at 178; see also Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. at 115 ("youth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condi-
tion of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence").
155 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 272 (West Supp. 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 233.1
(West Supp. 1983). The Supreme Court has recognized this fact as well. For example, it
repeatedly has upheld statutes designed to protect minors from their own impressionability,
even when these laws have infringed upon minors' constitutional rights. E.g., Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (Court upholds statute that limits minors' first amendment
rights by restricting their access to reading materials that the state defines as obscene for
minors, but not for adults).
156 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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itself, that transferred minors are as responsible as their elders. As dis-
cussed earlier, one reason for having the juvenile justice system is that
minors are less responsible than adults and thus deserve less punish-
ment.157 But this does not mean that minors deserve no punishment at
all. Thus, when minors are found to be dangerous or unsuitable candi-
dates for treatment, there is no reason to keep them in a rehabilitative
system that can neither control nor help them. 158 Similarly, it is accept-
able to transfer automatically those juveniles who commit certain seri-
ous crimes so that they may receive some punishment or so that others
might be deterred.' 5 9 It also may be acceptable to transfer juveniles in
order to alleviate the massive burden on the juvenile courts.' 60 But
none of these reasons commonly given to justify transfer suggest that it
has been adopted because some juveniles are as responsible as their el-
ders and deserve to receive the maximum penalties an adult can receive.
Nor do the criteria used in making transfer decisions indicate that
transferred minors are as accountable for their crimes as adults are for
theirs. Under legislative waiver, minors are transferred solely on the ba-
sis of the crime they allegedly committed. 161 These crimes are usually
very serious offenses, such as murder.162 But just because a minor com-
mits murder or rape or any other violent offense does not indicate that
society is less responsible for the minor's act. Nor is it evidence that the
minor is more mature than his peers or is able to control his conduct and
understand the consequences of his actions.
Under judicial waiver, minors are transferred because they are not
suitable candidates for treatment or because a disposition within the ju-
venile system would prove a threat to society. 163 The responsibility of
society for the juvenile's crime is not considered in making the waiver
decision, except perhaps to the extent that factors such as family back-
ground might be taken into account in making a treatment prognosis.
Indeed, it may be that those who are transferred are the very minors
who have suffered most from parental and community neglect and mis-
treatment. Likewise, an assessment of a juvenile's maturity, if one is
made at all, t 64 is only one of the numerous factors considered in deter-
157 See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
158 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
159 See supra notes 58-60, 66 and accompanying text. But set infra notes 227-43 and accom-
panying text.
160 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
161 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
162 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
163 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
164 Most statutes do not require that the minor's maturity be considered. Eg., ILL. ANN.
STAT. § 702-7(3)(a) (West 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.45(6)-(7) (West Supp. 1983). See
generaly BETWEEN Two WORLDS, supra note 35, at 150, 162. But even if an assessment of
maturity is made, it often is performed by a general trial judge rather than a juvenile court
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mining whether the minor is a suitable candidate for treatment.165 The
juvenile court need not find that minors are mature in order to transfer
them. 66 In fact, maturity rarely, if ever, plays a part in transfer deci-
sions.' 67 Indeed, as noted earlier, the most common bases for waiver are
inadequate resources and insufficient time to effectuate rehabilita-
tion. 168 Thus, most transfer decisions do not indicate that the minors
are mature or even that they cannot be rehabilitated; rather, they reflect
the inadequacies of the system.
169
Age plays a role in transfer decisions that are based on a finding
that a juvenile court disposition would prove a threat to society.170 That
a minor is fifteen or sixteen years old, however, does not by itself indi-
cate that the minor is as mature as an adult. The courts make no sepa-
rate assessment of maturity. The only other factors besides age that are
judge because of the heavy workloads of the juvenile court judges. General trial judges tend
to have little knowledge of the needs of minors and their levels of maturity. "Their in-service
training tends to be in areas such as criminal procedure and evidence," id. at 229, and their
professional memberships rarely include juvenile justice associations, see id. at 229-30.
165 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
166 Indeed, Monty Lee Eddings, one of the 18 juvenile offenders currently on death row,
was found to be even less mature than he should have been for his chronological age but was
transferred nonetheless. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. at 107; see also Sherfield v. State,
511 P.2d 598, 601 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973) ("The contention that before there can be a
proper certification there must be a showing that the juvenile has advanced emotional matur-
ity and a behavioral pattern greater than his chronological age is, in our view, without foun-
dation in the provisions of the Juvenile Act."); cf. Scharf, supra note 133 (study found that the
mean moral maturity level of delinquents ages fifteen to seventeen was similar to that of the
average ten- to twelve-year-old).
167 A recent study of waiver decisions found that the most important factors in the decision
to transfer are the seriousness of the offense, the extent of prior delinquency records, and the
results of previous treatment efforts within the juvenile justice system. See BETWEEN Two
WORLDS, supra note 35, at 211. Moreover, another recent study found that there are rarely
any psychological or intellectual differences between those youths for whom the courts grant
waiver and those youths for whom the waiver petitions are denied. Solway, Hays, Schreiner &
Cansler, Clinical Study of Youths Petitioned for Certification as Adults, 46 PSYCHOLOGICAL REP.
1067 (1980). The study concluded that the personal characteristics of minors are of little
importance in waiver decisions. See id. at 1073. It also has been suggested that the juvenile
courts are particularly eager to transfer minors who have been charged with murder and
other serious offenses. Considering such cases "too hot to handle," the juvenile courts tend to
ignore the personal characteristics of the minors involved and to focus solely on the serious-
ness of the offense. See Sacin & Sarri, Due Process-Reality or Myth, in BROUGHT TO JUSTICE?
JUVENILE COURTS AND THE LAW, supra note 31, at 187.
168 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
169 One commentator explains:
The basic [difficulty] is [the] assumption that responsibility for the failure of a juvenile to
respond to sirvices bespeaks universally of a deficiency on the part of the juvenile. No
recognition whatever is given to the fact that in personnel, in facilities and in knowledge
we are sadly lacking in our ability to help children change their behavior patterns. To
put the problem in terms of the 'imperviousness of individuals' is to obscure this impor-
tant segment of reality.
S. Fox, supra note 129, at 31-32; see also supra note 79 and accompanying text.
170 See supra notes 54, 56-57 and accompanying text.
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considered are the seriousness of the crime with which the minor is
charged and the minor's prior juvenile record.'
71
Further evidence supporting the position that transferred minors
are no more mature or able to control their conduct than their peers
who remain in the juvenile system is provided by the way society and
the criminal courts treat them. For example, transferred minors are still
subject to all the laws that society has enacted to protect them from
their own immaturity and inability to understand the consequences of
their actions. They cannot buy alcohol or cigarettes, they cannot marry
without the permission of their parents, and they cannot enter into con-
tracts, except for necessities. 172 Moreover, once convicted of a crime in
criminal court, their youth is given great weight by sentencers in deter-
mining the appropriate penalty.173 In capital punishment states, in par-
ticular, youth universally is recognized as mitigating against the
imposition of a death sentence. 174 Youth is recognized as a mitigating
factor precisely because it is presumed to evidence a lack of maturity
and an inability to control conduct and understand the consequences of
actions. 175 It thus appears that criminal courts and society in general
acknowledge that minors "are not irresponsible children one day and
responsible adults the next."'
176
Furthermore, the courts have recognized that the responsibility of
society for the minor's crime does not diminish when the minor is in
criminal court. The Supreme Court has held that a minor's troubled
childhood is a mitigating factor worthy of considerable weight, whereas
an adult's troubled youth may be of little importance in determining the
appropriate punishment.
177
171 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
172 See supra note 135-37 and accompanying text.
173 See supra note 72 and accompanying text; cf.Juvenie Crime Increase, supra note 40, at 13
(reports that only two percent of the serious juvenile offenders referred to criminal courts will
receive criminal sanctions following judicial waiver and conviction in criminal court); P.
GREENWOOD, J. PETERSILIA & F. ZIMRING, AGE, CRIME AND SANCTIONS: THE TRANSITION
FROM JUVENILE TO ADULT COURT (1980) (evidence indicates that for about two years fol-
lowing their graduation from juvenile court, young adults are treated more leniently than are
older offenders).
174 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. Youth also plays a major role in clemency
decisions. See Bedau, Death Sentences in New Jersq 1907-1960, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 25
(1964). Bedau reports that in New Jersey, the youngest age group (15-19) had a significantly
higher rate of commutation compared to older age groups. For example, only three people in
the youngest age group were executed and four had their sentences commuted. The next age
group (20-24), on the other hand, saw 34 executed and only two received commutations. Id.
175 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
176 Feld, supra note 43, at 511.
177 See supra note 153 and accompanying text. Lower appellate courts repeatedly have
reduced a juvenile defendant's sentence on the ground that the youth's troubled childhood
and unstable family life mitigated against the imposition of a harsh penalty. Eg., People v.
Howell, 16 Ill. App. 3d 989, 993-94, 307 N.E.2d 172, 175-76 (1974); State v. Blanton, 166 NJ.
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Thus, the reasons why minors are less responsible than adults hold
for transferred juveniles. Even if particular minors are mature and do
understand the consequences of their acts, they are still less accountable
than adults for their crimes, because society still shares greatly in the
responsibility for their criminal acts. Indeed, this is one factor that re-
mains true in regard to all juvenile crime. 178 As the Supreme Court has
pointed out, "Not only is it difficult to define, let alone determine ma-
turity, but the fact that a minor may be very much an adult in some
respects does not mean that his need and opportunity for growth under
parental guidance and discipline have ended."'
179
4 The Responsibility of Minors when Aggravating Factors are Established
For the death penalty to be imposed on an adult or a minor, one or
more aggravating circumstances must exist.' 80 Therefore, before it may
be concluded that juveniles accused of capital crimes are always less re-
sponsible than their adult counterparts, this Comment must examine
whether the existence of an aggravating factor increases the responsibil-
ity of minors, making them as responsible as adults.
One of the aggravating circumstances commonly found in death
penalty statutes is that the killing was "especially heinous, atrocious or
cruel,"' 8 ' meaning that the killing involved torture or some aggravated
battery to the victim. 182 That a minor commits a "heinous" murder
certainly indicates that he has caused more harm than did the adult
who committed a nonheinous killing.183 It can never indicate, however,
that the minor is as responsible as an adult. That a minor commits a
murder in an especially cruel manner does not indicate that the youth is
as mature as an adult or that the minor is able to control his conduct or
appreciate the consequences of his act. Nor does it indicate that society
Super. 62, 73-75, 398 A.2d 1328, 1334-35 (1979); Mattino v. State, 539 S.W.2d 824, 827
(Tenn. Grim. App. 1976).
178 Even where minors come from wealthy homes with caring parents, something clearly
went awry in their socialization process or they would not have engaged in antisocial behav-
ior. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. Their parents and society both share in the
responsibility for their crimes, as they failed to prevent the youths from engaging in such
behavior. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
179 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 n.23 (1979).
180 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
181 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(h) (West Supp. 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
2000(e)(9) (1978).
182 See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-33 (1980).
183 However, as noted earlier, under Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982), the death
penalty is disproportionate no matter how much harm was caused by the act if the offender
was not sufficiently responsible for the harm. See supra notes 119-26 and accompanying text;
see also A. VON HIRscH, supra note 111, at 69 (in determining culpability, "we are not looking
exclusively to the act, but also to how much the actor can be held to blame for his act and its
consequences") (emphasis in original).
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is in any way less responsible for the minor's crime. Thus, a minor who
commits a murder that is heinous, atrocious and cruel is still less respon-
sible for the crime than is an adult who commits a murder that is not.
The other aggravating factors found in death penalty statutes tend
to be motivated wholly by utilitarian considerations. 184 A finding that
the offender poses a future threat to society; 85 that the murder victim
was a police officer, judge, or some other government official; 186 or that
the murder was committed by a person in, or who had escaped from, the
lawful custody of a police officer 87 never can increase the responsibility
of a minor, making him as responsible as an adult.
5 Conclusion Regarding the Disproportionaliy Test
As this examination ofjuvenile responsibility has evidenced, minors
are never as responsible as adults, even if they have been transferred and
even if aggravating factors have been found. Thus, under the Enmund
disproportionality analysis, which focuses on the responsibility of a class
of persons rather than on the consequences to the victim and the cate-
gory of the crime, 8 the death penalty always will be disproportionate
punishment for children and adolescents. 189 This does not mean that
184 At least one commentator has suggested that such aggravating factors can never justify
the imposition of the death sentence as they have no bearing on culpability and thus in no
way indicate that one defendant deserves the death penalty more than another. See Radin,
supra note 99, at 1154 n.36; cf. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 288 (1980) (Powell, J., dis-
senting) ("The inquiry [about the proportionality of the punishment] focuses on whether a
person deserves such punishment, not simply on whether punishment would serve a utilita-
rian goal').
185 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12(7) (West 1983).
186 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(5) (1983).
187 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(9) (1983).
188 See supra notes 119-26 and accompanying text.
189 The blanket exclusion of minors from death sentences on the basis of this disproportion-
ality analysis does not contradict those Supreme Court decisions that establish that in death
penalty cases there must be individualized consideration of the circumstances of the particu-
lar offense and the character of the particular offender to determine whether the particular
offender deserves a death sentence. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. at 110-12; Lock-
ett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. at 604-09; see supra note 70 and accompanying text. To exclude all
minors from capital sentencing at first glance may appear to contradict this requirement:
some minors, for example, may be more responsible than others and thus more deserving of
the death penalty. This observation, however, misses the mark. The disproportionality prin-
ciple operates as a sort of per se rule, making individualized consideration unnecessary. In
other words, if the punishment is disproportionate, it will remain disproportionate regardless
of the circumstances of the particular offense or the characteristics of the particular defend-
ant. For example, in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598-600 (1978) (plurality opinion), the
Supreme Court held that capital punishment is a disproportionate penalty for the crime of
rape, because no matter how responsible the particular offender may be and no matter how
atrocious the circumstances of a particular rape, death always will be a disproportionate pen-
alty. Seesupra notes 113-15 and accompanying text. Also under Enmund, it is irrelevant that a
sentencer may consider the felony murderer's lack of intent and limited participation in the
killing in determining whether he or she deserves the death penalty, as the Court has held
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minors may not be tried in criminal courts or that they may not be
punished. What it does mean is that the criminal justice system must
recognize the distinct differences between minors and adults and never
may treat them as if they are alike by imposing that maximum penalty,
death, on minors.' 90
C. CONTRIBUTION TO ACCEPTABLE GOALS OF PUNISHMENT
For a punishment to be constitutional under the excessiveness
strand of the eighth amendment, it not only must be proportionate to
the offense; it also must make a measurable contribution to acceptable
goals of punishment. 19 1 In elaborating on this second requirement, the
Supreme Court has said that the punishment in question does not have
to serve a goal better than a less severe punishment, but that "the sanc-
tion imposed cannot be so totally without penological justification that
it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering."'
192
Many purposes conceivably are served by capital punishment.
1 93
that those factors always indicate diminished responsibility and thus that death always would
be a disproportionate punishment. See Enmund, 102 S. Ct. at 3377; see also Note, supra note
109, at 1570-71. It is therefore equally unnecessary for the courts to consider the circum-
stances of a minor's particular offense or the characteristics of the individual minor, because,
as has been shown, minors are in all cases less responsible than adults, and thus never as
deserving of the death penalty as the adult offender. Death therefore always will be a dispro-
portionate punishment when imposed on minors.
190 Punishing minors differently from adults who commit the same crimes does not raise
fourteenth amendment equal protection problems. Age is not a suspect classification. Vance
v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307
(1976) (per curiam). Thus, different treatment based on age will not violate the Equal Pro-
tection Clause if there is a rational basis for the distinction. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 312, 314. As
minors are always less responsible for their crimes than adults are for theirs, there is certainly
a rational justification for punishing them differently.
191 See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
192 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 182-83.
193 In addition to retribution and general and specific deterrence, which are discussed in
the text, capital punishment conceivably could serve the goals of encouraging guilty pleas and
confessions, eugenics, and economy. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 142 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
The encouragement of guilty pleas and confessions never could justify the infliction of
capital punishment on anyone, minor or adult. In the first place, if the death penalty is used
to encourage guilty pleas and thus to deter suspects from exercising their fifth amendment
rights to jury trials, it is unconstitutional. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581
(1968). (Jackson applies to the states under the criteria articulated in Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).) In the second place, life imprisonment is a severe sanction that can
be used as leverage for bargaining for pleas or confessions in exchange for either charges of
lesser offenses or recommendations of leniency. Thus, the death penalty is unnecessary for
bargaining purposes. A life sentence is an especially useful tool in regard to minors who
would face potentially 50 or 60 years in prison. Furthermore, the only possible reason for
wanting to encourage guilty pleas and confessions is to save court time and reduce the bur-
dens on the courts. It cannot be to save investigatory time or to prevent the guilty from going
free, because no one is likely to be encouraged to confess or plead guilty unless the case
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But only three purposes have been offered formally by courts and legis-
against him or her is strong. But if the only purpose is to save the court time and energy, then
the death penalty is a particularly inappropriate bargaining instrument. Courts admittedly
spend more time with death cases. See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 196 (1953), overruled
on other groundr, Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 391 (1964); cf. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77
(1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result). Also death sentences invariably are appealed,
thus increasing the burden on the appellate courts. Therefore, whatever court time may be
saved by obtaining confessions or pleading agreements is unlikely to counter the additional
time spent by the courts on those cases in which the defendants refuse to plea bargain or
confess and are thus tried for capital offenses where the death penalty is sought.
Virtually everyone agrees that capital punishment cannot be defended solely on the basis
of any eugenic purpose. See, e.g., Barzun, In Favor of Capital Punishment, in THE DEATH PEN-
ALTY IN AMERICA 154 (H. Bedau ed. rev. ed. 1967); Caldwell, Why is the Death Penalty Re-
tained? 284 ANNALS 45, 49-50 (1952); Johnson, Selective Factors in Capital Punishment, 36 Soc.
FORCES 165, 169 (1957); Sellin, Capital Punishment, 25 FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1961, at 3.
Fortunately, our nation never has proffered eugenic goals.
Saving money rarely is given as a reason for having the death penalty. It does appear to
be a concern of some, however, as this dialogue between lawyer Jay Baker and Justices Rehn-
quist and Marshall during oral argument in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982),
evidences:
[Justice Rehnquist wondered what counsel would have the state do with the defendant if
it is unable to execute him. Should he be confined for life under a psychiatrist's care? the
Justice asked.]
Baker: Yes.
Justice Rehnquist: Why should the taxpayers have to foot the bill?
Baker: It would be cheaper than executing him.
Justice Rehnquist: From the taxpayers' point of view?
Baker: More will have been spent on the defendant's case than would have been
spent had he received some other sentence.
Justice Rehnquist: Only because of the protracted litigation.
Justice Marshall: It would have been cheaper still to have shot the defendant at the
time of his arrest.
Baker: That's correct.
30 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 4086-87 (Nov. 11, 1981).
Even if economy were given as a reason for having the death penalty, the evidence indi-
cates that it does cost more to execute a person than to keep the offender in prison for life. See
B. ESHELMAN & F. RILEY, DEATH Row CHAPLAIN 226 (1962); Caldwell, supra, at 48; McGee,
Capital Punishment as Seen by a Correctional Administrator, 28 FED. PROBATION, June 1964, at 11,
13. This applies equally to minors, even though they will on average spend a longer time in
prison if sentenced to life without parole, as the costs of carrying out a death sentence are
enormous. For example, a disproportionate amount of the money spent on prisons is attribu-
table to death row. See Caldwell, supra, at 48; McGee, supra, at 11. Condemned adults and
minors are not productive members of the prison community, although they could be. Mc-
Gee, supra, at 13-14; Bailey, Rehabilitation on Death Row, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA
556 (H. Bedau ed. rev. ed. 1967). Moreover, executions themselves are very expensive. T.
THOMAS, THIS LIFE WE TAKE 20-22 (3d ed. 1965). Appeals often are automatic and courts
admittedly spend more time with death cases. See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 196
(1953), overruled on other grounds, Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 391 (1964). "At trial, the
selection of jurors is likely to become a costly, time-consuming problem in a capital case
... " Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 358 (Marshall, J., concurring); see, e.g., Witherspoon
v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). During the period between conviction and execution, there
are a number of collateral attacks on conviction and attempts to obtain executive clemency,
all of which exhaust the time, money, and efforts of the state. Minors are particularly likely
to seek clemency as they have had much success in the past. See supra note 174 and accompa-
nying text. Continual assertions that the condemned prisoner has gone insane are made. See
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latures: retribution, general deterrence, and specific deterrence. 94 Cap-
ital punishment for minors cannot pass eighth amendment scrutiny
because it fails to make a "measurable contribution" to any of these
goals.
.. Retribution
The question of whether retribution is an appropriate purpose of
punishment has been, and continues to be, hotly debated. 195 But retri-
bution has gained increasing support in the last decade, 196 and the
Supreme Court has held that it is not "a forbidden objective" of
punishment. 197
Retribution may take various forms.' 98 The Supreme Court's anal-
ysis of the retributive foundations of capital punishment incorporates
Slovenko, And the Penalty is (Sometimes) Death, 24 ANTIOCH REV. 351 (1964). Because there is
a formally established policy of not executing insane persons, see Caritativo v. California, 357
U.S. 549 (1958) (per curiam), great sums of money may be spent on detecting and curing
mental illness in order to perform the execution. As no one wants the responsibility for the
execution, the condemned person is likely to be passed back and forth from doctors to custo-
dial officials to courts like a ping-pong ball, and all at state expense. Slovenko, supra, at 363.
194 See Bayer, Crime, Punishment and the Decline of Liberal Optimism, 27 CRIME & DELINQ. 169,
187 (1981); Radin, supra note 99, at 1145 n.7; see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 183 &
n.28.
195 See, e.g., 1 J.F. ARCHBOLD, ON THE PRACTICE, PLEADING, AND EVIDENCE IN CRIMI-
NAL CASES §§ 11-17, xv-xix (T. Waterman ed. 7th ed. 1860); C. BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND
PUNISHMENT (H. Paolucci trans. 1963); M. COHEN, REASON AND LAW 41-44 (1950); H.L.A.
HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 60-69 (1963); H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMI-
NAL SANCTION 37-39 (1968); Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law , 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
401 (1958)..
196 See W. BERNS, FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRIME AND THE MORALITY OF THE
DEATH PENALTY (1979); G. NEWMAN, THE PUNISHMENT RESPONSE (1978); E. VAN DEN
HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS (1975); A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 111; J. MURPHY, Cruel and
Unusual Punishments, in RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE AND THERAPY 223 (1979).
197 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 183. But see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 343-45
(Marshall, J., concurring) (argues that retribution is not a proper justification for
punishment).
198 One view toward retribution, not discussed in the text, is that punishment of those who
break the law is required to vindicate or restore some transcendant order. See W. BERNS, supra
note 196, at 172; E. VAN DEN HAAc, supra note 196, at 11-12. According to this view, punish-
ment of criminals is good in itself, aside from its instrumental effect on the community. This
is what Kant's famous pronouncement about the last murderer suggests:
Even if a civil society were to dissolve itself by common agreement of all its members (for
example, if the people inhabiting an island decided to separate and disperse themselves
around the world), the last murderer remaining in prison must first be executed, so that
everyone will duly receive what his actions are worth and so that the bloodguilt thereof
will not be fixed on the people because they failed to insist on carrying out the punish-
ment ....
I. KANT, The Metaphysical Elements ofJustice, Part I of THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 102 (J.
Ladd trans. 1965). This traditionally theological view of retribution rarely emerges in mod-
ern writing as a goal of capital sentencing, see E. EVANS, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 9 (1906), and it has been largely discredited. See Bedau, Concessions to
Retribution in Punishment, in JUSTICE & PUNISHMENT 68 (J. Cederblom & W. Blizek eds. 1977);
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two models of retribution: an institutional revenge model and a "just
deserts" model. 99
a. The institutional revenge model
The institutional revenge model of retribution justifies punishment
as necessary to ensure that citizens will not take the law into their own
hands and personally satisfy their desire for vengeance.200 It is very un-
likely, however, that members of society will seek personal vengeance if
minors do not receive the death penalty for their capital crimes. As mi-
nors are less responsible than adults for their crimes, 20 1 there should be
less moral outrage toward a juvenile's offense than toward that of an
adult.20 2 But even if there is such moral outrage, the transfer itself and a
Hughes, License to Kill, 26 N.Y. REv. BooKs 22 (1979); Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 217 (1973).
Another notion of retribution, not discussed in the text, is that criminals owe a debt to
the community. Assuming that the criminal had a free choice to break the social compact,
punishment evens the score by counterbalancing the unfair gains the criminal secured against
others who restrained themselves. See Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIsT 475, 476-79
(1968). This "debt" approach has been subjected to the criticism that its notion of law abiders
restraining themselves because of reliance on others doing likewise makes more sense for traf-
fic offenses and shoplifting than for murder and rape. See, e.g., G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING
CRIMINAL LAW 417 (1978).
A variant of the "debt" view of retribution is one that posits that some extent of the
criminal's personal interests are forfeited to the community as payment for the personal inter-
ests of which he deprived the victim. However, as Hugo Bedau points out, it is hard to see
why the criminal should "pay" the community rather than the victim. See Bedau, supra, at
68.
199 The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARv. L. REv. 55, 65-66 & n.25; see Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. at 183-84.
200 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 183. The notion that the purpose of retribution is to
obviate personal revenge can take two forms: social contract notions or deterrence notions.
Under the social contract notion, people in a civilized society agree not to take personal re-
venge only because the government has been constituted as an agent to do it for the people.
See, e.g., J. BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY (1975). Under the deterrence notion, "gov-
ernmental revenge is necessary to deter those who commit private acts of violence in the name
of revenge." H. PACKER, supra note 195, at 37-38. In both forms, the implicit idea is that the
social costs of systematic governmental revenge will be less than the social costs of random
private revenge. Seegenerally Radin,supra note 99, at 1169-70. Numerous commentators have
argued that such utilitarian notions of retribution never can justify punishment because they
fail to take the offender's culpability into account. See H. PACKER, supra note 195, at 38-39;
A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 111, at 70; Greenawah, "Uncontrollable" Actions and the Eighth
Amendment: Implications of Powell v. Texas, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 927, 939 & n. 6 4, 940 (1969).
For example, under this utilitarian rationale, a man whom the authorities knew to be inno-
cent could be punished, if members of the community believed him guilty and threatened to
seek personal revenge unless he were punished. See E. VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 196, at 12-
13.
201 See supra notes 129-90 and accompanying text.
202 See Hertz & Weisberg, In Mitigation of the Penalty oDeath: Lockett v. Ohio and the Capital
Defendant's Right to Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 317, 388 (1981)
(a person who is less responsible for a crime is likely to invoke less moral outrage than the
person who is more responsible for a crime); Liebman & Shepard, supra note 70, at 812 (to the
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sanction short of death should appease it. Adult first-degree murderers
usually will receive life sentences or the death penalty, but juvenile mur-
derers could have received rehabilitative dispositions from the juvenile
courts. Thus, the very fact that they are tried in criminal courts and
eligible for life sentences should soothe the anger of many. Furthermore,
the execution of a minor itself will be a source of outrage and protest
among some members of the populace,20 3 thus creating the very prob-
lem it was supposed to prevent.
b. The "just deserts" model
The other model of retribution used by the Supreme Court in its
analysis assumes the necessity of punishment as the "just deserts" for a
criminal action. 20 4 "Just deserts" may not be an adequate justification
for executing minors, however. Although the Supreme Court has held
that this type of retribution is not a "forbidden objective" of punish-
ment, 20 5 its decision was made in the context of adult punishment.
Quite a different conclusion may be reached in the context of punishing
minors.
Retribution never has been given as a reason for judicial waiver.
The justifications offered have been the protection of society, the deter-
rence of juvenile crime, the alleviation of the juvenile court's massive
workload, 20 6 and the inability of the juvenile justice system to rehabili-
tate the offender with the resources currently available in the juvenile
system.20 7 When minors are transferred for these reasons, it does not
mean that they are beyond rehabilitation or always will be danger-
ous. 20 8 It usually means only that the facilities of the juvenile justice
system are inadequate or otherwise unsuited to treating their delin-
quency or dangerous tendencies. 20 9 Because the system cannot serve
them, they are passed on to the criminal courts. It is therefore question-
able whether the criminal system is justified in punishing these minors
extent the defendant's responsibility is reduced, societal need for vengeance is diminished
correspondingly and the mitigation of punishment is warranted).
203 See Vandall, The Use of Force in Dealing with Juveniles: Guidelines, 17 GRIM. L. BULL. 124,
143 (1981) (using "physical force in dealing with juveniles is likely to inflame the community
unless clearly justified"); cf. Bedau, supra note 174, at 24 (reports that prior to 1958, there had
been only one serious effort in New Jersey to replace the death penalty with imprisonment
and that this effort was prompted by the execution of a 16-year-old boy. In 1953, after an
unsuccessful effort to indict a youth under 16 for first-degree murder, it became the law in
New Jersey that no one under 16 could be sentenced to death).
204 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 183-84.
205 Id. at 183.
206 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
207 See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
208 See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
209 See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
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for retributive reasons when they were not placed in the system for such
purposes, but were sent there largely because the juvenile justice system
was incapable of doing its job.
210
Similarly, the "just deserts" model of retribution never has been
offered formally as a reason for legislative waiver.2 1' Of course, one of
the reasons for this waiver method, which automatically transfers mi-
nors accused of certain serious crimes, is so that juveniles will receive
harsher punishments than they would in the juvenile system. 2 12 This
does not mean, however, that they are transferred so that they will re-
ceive their "just deserts." Indeed, once minors are in the criminal sys-
tem, every effort is made to see that they do not receive their "just
deserts.". In many states, minors sentenced by criminal courts may be
placed in juvenile facilities 2 13 and in a few states the criminal courts are
prohibited from placing minors in adult prisons.2 14 Moreover, numer-
ous legislatures have enacted rehabilitative programs for minors sen-
tenced by the criminal courts. 2 15 Appellate courts have reduced
sentences on the ground that the retributive punishment imposed failed
to reflect the young defendant's potential for rehabilitation. 2 16 And trial
courts generally treat minors more leniently than older offenders.
2 17
But even if one of the purposes of judicial and legislative waiver is
for juveniles to get their "just deserts," capital punishment for minors
never can make a "measurable contribution" to this goal. Because this
model of retribution is based on desert, it is imperative that the punish-
210 Of course, it could be argued that retribution is an implicit purpose ofjudicial waiver,
even if it is not an explicit one. Legislatures that have enacted judicial waiver statutes cer-
tainly are aware that when minors are transferred they typically are eligible to receive retrib-
utive punishments from the criminal system. However, it certainly is questionable whether
this implicit acceptance of the possibility of retributive punishment amounts to a legislative
desire that transferred minors be punished for retributive purposes. Indeed, many legislatures
have enacted rehabilitative programs for minors sentenced by the criminal courts and have
passed statutes that allow the criminal courts to place convicted minors in juvenile correc-
tional facilities. See in/a notes 213-15 and accompanying text.
211 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
212 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
213 BETWEN Two WORLDS, supra note 35, at 73-77.
214 Both Kentucky and Delaware require that offenders under 18 years old be placed in
facilities established efclusively for minors. Id.
215 See, e.g., The Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1976 & Supp. V
1981). Under the Act, federal judges are obligated to consider the special rehabilitative sen-
tencing alternatives created by the Act before sentencing any person between the ages of 16
and 22. The Act was expressly "designed to provide a better method for treating young
offenders convicted in federal courts in that vulnerable age bracket, to rehabilitate them and
restore them to normal behavior patterns." Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 432-33
(1974).
216 Se, e.g., Ahvik v. State, 613 P.2d 1252 (Alaska 1980); People v. Wilkins, 36 Ill. App. 3d
761, 767, 344 N.E.2d 724, 729 (1976).
217 SeeJuvenile Crime Increase, supra note 40, at 13.
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ment be proportionate to the culpability of the offender and the of-
fense.2 18 As juvenile murderers are always less responsible, and thus less
culpable, than adult murderers, 2 19 they never will deserve the maximum
penalty that may be imposed on adults.
220
2. General Deterrence
Those who justify capital punishment on grounds of general deter-
rence claim that the adoption of this punishment will dissuade people
from committing capital crimes. 22 1 There is no agreement as to whether
capital punishment accomplishes this result.222 Even the Supreme
Court has admitted that proof of the death penalty's deterrent effect is
"inconclusive. '223 But, "in the absence of more convincing evidence,"
the Court has held that it would defer to the judgment of those legisla-
tures that maintain that capital punishment is a deterrent to crime.
224
The debate over the deterrent effect of capital punishment, as well as
the Supreme Court's decision, however, have focused on the deterrent
effect of capital punishment when imposed on adults. There is "more
convincing evidence" that the death penalty when imposed on minors is
not a deterrent to crime.
The execution of minors will not deter the general population from
committing capital crimes. Many have suggested that potential mur-
derers are most likely to be deterred by the execution of a murderer with
218 See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 25 (1968); Gardner, The Renais-
sance of Retribution-An Examination of Doing Justice, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 781, 798; Gibbs, The
Death Penalty, Retribution and Penal Poli, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 291, 293-96 (1978);
Greenawalt, supra note 200, at 938; Wasserstrom, HLA. Hart and the Doctrines of Mens Rea and
Criminal Responsibility, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 92, 93 (1967).
219 See supra notes 129-90 and accompanying text.
220 Retributivists who have discussed the mechanics of administering retribution in indi-
vidual cases have recognized that the retribution imposed must reflect the degree to which the
offender and offense are more or less blameworthy than other offenders and offenses. See, e.g.,
A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 111, at 74, 79, 82; Hospers, Retribution: The Ethics of Punishment, in
ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 181,
188-90 (R. Barnett &J. Hagel eds. 1977).
221 H. PACKER, supra note 195, at 39; Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment,
114 U. PA. L. REV. 949, 950-51 (1966).
222 See, e.g., C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MIS-
TAKE 25-27 (1974); DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES (A. Blumstein, J. Cohen & D. Nagin eds. 1978);
Baldus & Cole, A Comparison of the Work of Thorsten Sellin and Isaac Ehrlich on the Deterrent Effect of
Capital Punishment, 85 YALE LJ. 170 (1975); Ehrlich, Capital Punishment and Deterrence.- Some
Further Thoughts and Additional Evidence, 85 J. POL. ECON. 741 (1977); Forst, The Deterrent Eff ct
of Capital Punishment: A Cross-State Analysis ofthe 1960's, 61 MINN. L. REV. 743 (1977); Passel &
Taylor, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Another View, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 445 (1977);
Schuessler, The Deterrent Infltence of the Death Penalty, 284 ANNALS 54 (1952); Sellin, Homicides in
Retentionist and Abolitionist States, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 135 (. Sellin ed. 1967).
223 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 183.
224 Id. at 184-87.
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whose character and action they can readily identify.225 It is therefore
extremely doubtful that the execution of minors will deter adults.
Moreover, numerous commentators have concluded that when an of-
fender is particularly distinguishable from other members of the popula-
tion, the failure to punish him or her does not impair the deterrent effect
of the threatened punishment on "normal" members of the popula-
tion.226 Thus, not only is the execution of minors unlikely to deter
adults from committing capital crimes, but failure to execute them will
have no effect on the success of capital punishment as a deterrent.
Capital punishment for minors also will fail to deter minors from
committing crimes. In the first place, it is doubtful that minors are ca-
pable of being deterred. Proponents of the concept of deterrence who
have attempted to identify the particular individual most likely to be
deterred by the threat of punishment 227 have found that in order to
respond to deterrence an individual must have the intellectual capacity
to understand the threat of punishment and control mechanisms to con-
form to that understanding.228 Minors lack both. Children and adoles-
cents tend to live for today, giving little thought to the future
consequences of their actions.229 They are particularly unlikely to un-
derstand the legal consequences of their crimes.230
Moreover, most minors have no fear of death. They simply have
not learned to accept its finality and believe that old people die, not
225 See, e.g., A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 13 (1967); Liebman & Shepard, supra
note 70, at 813-17.
226 See, e.g., A. GoLDSTEIN,supra note 225, at 13; G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW 467 (1961);
Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide: 1, 37 COLUM. L. REv. 701, 752-57
(1937).
227 Current proponents of deterrence have focused far more on this subject than did their
utilitarian predecessors. Compare Chappell, Geis & Hardt, Explorations in Deterrence and Criminal
Justice, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 514, 520-24 (1972) (reviewing theorists' attempts to identify individ-
uals who will be deterred by threats of punishment) and Geerken & Gove, Deterrence: Some
Theoretical Considerations, 9 LAw & Soc'y REv. 497, 509-12 (1975) (discussing potential offend-
ers' perception of risk as a deterrent mechanism) with J. BENTHAM, Principles of Penal Law, in
WORKS 396 (1943) (making an example of offender should be chief end of punishment).
228 See A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 225, at 12-13; Andenaes, supra note 221, at 958; Silving,
Mental Incapaciy in Criminal Law, 2 CURRENT L. & SOC. PROBS. 3, 25 (1961); van den Haag,
On Deterrence and the Death Penaly, 60 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 141, 143
(1969); cf. Gardiner, The Purpose of Ciminal Punishment, 21 MOD. L. REv. 117, 122 (1958)
(theories regarding the deterrent value of punishment rest "on the assumption that we are
rational beings who always think before we act, and then base our actions on a careful calcu-
lation of the gains and losses involved").
229 See Kastenbaum, Time and Death in Adolescence, in THE MEANING OF DEATH 99 (H.
Feifel ed. 1959); see also supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
230 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Program O01 rs Juvenile Ofenders A Second Chance, 3 JUST. ASSIST-
ANCE NEwS, Oct. 1982, at 3 (most juveniles, even those who are streetwise, do not know their
rights and responsibilities or the legal consequences of their criminal acts) [hereinafter cited as
Program Offers Juvenile Ofenders A Second Chance].
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teenagers.23 1 In fact, the threat of capital punishment may make crime
more appealing and exciting to youths. Adolescents are in a develop-
mental stage of defiance toward death and danger that produces much
risk-taking behavior,232 and minors often play games of chance with
death out of a feeling of omnipotence. 233 That minors commonly flirt
with death is evidenced by their propensity toward reckless driving and
experimentation with dangerous drugs.
Even if minors understand the threat of punishment and fear
death, they have not developed sufficient control over their behavior to
conform to that understanding and fear.2 3 4 Minors, for example, tend
to seek the approval of their peers, responding to dangerous dares even
when they fear the consequences.2 35 It is for this reason that most youth
crimes are committed in groups.23 6 Capital punishment for minors very
well may give gang leaders the leverage necessary to persuade members
to participate in the gang's illegal activities; there may be no more effec-
tive way of gaining the cooperation of unwilling adolescents than by
calling them "chicken" in front of their peers.
2 37
Yet another reason why capital punishment will not deter minors is
that it is particularly uncertain whether they will receive the death pen-
231 See R. LONETTO, CHILDREN'S CONCEPTIONS OF DEATH 134-41 (1980); Hostler, The
Development of the Child's Concept of Death, in THE CHILD AND DEATH (0. Sahler ed. 1978). See
generally Kastenbaum, supra note 229.
232 See E. ERICKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 261-63 (2d ed. 1963); Fredlund, Children
and Deathfrom the School Setting Viewpoint, 47 J. ScH. HEALTH 533 (1977); see also supra notes
139-141 and accompanying text.
233 Miller, Adolescent Suicide: Etiolog and Treatment, in 9 ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 327 (S.
Feinstein, J. Looney, A. Schwartzberg & A. Sorosky eds. 1981); see also Anthony, The Child's
Idea of Death, in THE WORLD OF THE CHILD 336 (T. Talbot ed. 1967); Fredlund, supra note
232, at 534 ("many [adolescents] ...have a tremendous need to prove over and over again
that they are immune [from death]").
234 See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
235 See E. ERICKSON, supra note 232, at 261-63; cf. Program Offers Juvenile Ofenders A Second
Chance, supra note 230, at 3 (reports on a Washington, D.C. program that teaches juveniles
'how not to rob the grocery store when the gang wants to but you don't'").
236 See PREVENTION OF SERIOUS DELINQUENCY, supra note 38, at 1, 24, 25, 61; Zimring,
Kids, Groups and Crime: Some Implications of a Well-Known Secret, 72 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOL-
OGY 867, 867 (1981). See generally NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELIN-
QUENCY PREVENTION, CRIME BY YOUTH GANGS AND GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES
(preliminary version 1981).
237 See Malmquist, Premonitory Signs of Homicidal Aggression in Juveniles, 128 AM. J. PSYCHIA-
TRY 461, 464 (1971). Malmquist reports that one of the factors commonly leading up to
juvenile murders is "threats to manhood" from gang members and girlfriends. Id. As an
example, Malmquist tells of the case of a 15-year-old boy who had developed a close relation-
ship with a teenage girl:
The couple decided to obtain money for a vacation by holding up a cab driver. The
plan was to tell the cabbie to stop and hand over his money. Instead, the cabbie sped
down the street while the girl screamed at the boy: 'Shoot! Kill him! Don't be yellow,
you weakling!' He briefly hesitated but then shot the man in the back.
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alty. Research indicates that the certainty of receiving a particular pun-
ishment is the primary source of its preventive restraint. 238 Of course, it
is never certain that an adult will receive a death sentence. 239 But in the
case of minors, the uncertainty is far greater. Most minors, including
those who commit violent crimes, do not think that they will get
caught,240 and studies have found that they usually do not.24 1 More-
over, even when they are arrested, there is often no assurance that they
will be tried in criminal court.242 Even if they are transferred to criminal
court, their youth is always a mitigating factor given great weight in
death penalty sentencing decisions.
243
Thus, capital punishment for minors is very unlikely to deter mi-
nors or adults from committing crimes, and may even encourage some
minors to do so.
3. Speqft Deterrence
Under a specific deterrence justification, the purpose of capital
punishment is to protect society from the threat of future crimes by the
particular capital offender. 244 In Gregg v. Georgia,245 the Supreme Court
238 See J. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE (1975); Andenaes, GeneralPreven-
lion Revisited- Research and Poliqy Implications, 66 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 338 (1975).
239 The Supreme Court has held mandatory death penalty statutes, which provide that the
death penalty must be imposed on all offenders convicted of certain crimes, to be unconstitu-
tional. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 330 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 293, 304 (1976).
240 THE RELATIONSHIP OF ADULT CRIMINAL CAREERS TO JUVENILE CAREERS, supra note
141, at 10.
241 See THE PREVENTION OF SERIOUS DELINQUENCY, supra note 38, at 60 (most serious
juvenile offenses do not result in arrest); Farrington, Longitudinal Research on Crime and Delin-
quency, in 1 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 289 (N. Morris & M.
Tonry eds. 1979) (between 3% to 15% of all delinquent acts ever result in "police contact,"
much less an arrest); Mann, Friedman & Friedman, Characteristics of Sef-Reported Violent Offend-
ers Versus Court Identiied Violent Offenders, 4 INT'L J. CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 69-87 (1976)
(noting study that found that approximately 60% of a sample of predominantly poor, black
high school-aged boys in Philadelphia who reported involvement in "multiple violent acts"
never were apprehended).
242 This is particularly true if they reside in a judicial waiver jurisdiction. One author
notes:
Judicial waiver practices have contributed to the erosion of the deterrence associ-
ated with the imposition of criminal sanctions. There can be no degree of certainty in a
discretionary certification system since every decision is necessarily individualized. A
youth may appear in juvenile court on numerous occasions, and there is no way to antici-
pate whether the next appearance will result in yet another juvenile disposition or a
waiver proceeding. Indeed, many waived youths have been the subjects of previous un-
successful certification proceedings.
Feld, supra note 43, at 517-18.
243 See supra notes 71, 72 and accompanying text.
244 See H. PACKER, supra note 195, at 39; Andenaes, Does Punishment Deter Crime? 11 GRIM.
L.Q. 76, 78 (1968).
245 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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noted that specific deterrence may be one of the purposes of capital pun-
ishment.246 The Court did not rely on this justification in finding that
the death penalty served acceptable goals of punishment, however, per-
haps because incarceration is equally effective in preventing future
crimes by the criminals involved.
247
Even if capital punishment makes some necessary contribution to
the goal of specific deterrence in regard to adult offenders, it is com-
pletely unnecessary in order to prevent juvenile offenders from engaging
in future criminal conduct. Just because a minor is found to be "dan-
gerous" or incapable of being rehabilitated by the resources available in
the juvenile justice system does not mean that he will not reform as he
grows older. As has been noted, "It is impossible to make a judgment
that a fourteen-year-old, no matter how bad, will remain incorrigible for
the rest of his life. '" 248 In fact, most juvenile crime, including violent
crime, abates with age.2 4 9 Many youths may commit only one serious
offense and then cease to be criminally active. 250 Although juveniles
who commit repeated violent crimes tend to persist in criminal activity
into their twenties, 25 1 their criminal involvement usually reduces gradu-
ally and finally ceases shortly thereafter.252 Indeed, the "possibility of
significant character and behavioral changes in young adults ages eight-
een to twenty-five is a recognized phenomenon," 253 and the evidence
shows that juvenile murderers are low-rate recidivists.
254
Nor is the death penalty necessary to prevent a minor sentenced to
life imprisonment from committing a subsequent offense while incarcer-
ated. In most states, all life prisoners have the possibility of parole.
255
246 Id. at 183 n.28.
247 See Liebman & Shepard, supra note 70, at 813; The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 56, 72 (1976).
248 Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. 1968).
249 See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
250 D. HAMPARIAN, R. SCHUSTER, S. DINrrz &J. CONRAD, THE VIOLENT FEW 52 (1978);
P. STRASBURG, VIOLENT DELINQUENTS 35-36 (1978); M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO & T. SEL-
IUN, supra note 139, at 160; Feld, supra note 43, at 509-11.
251 See P. STRASBURG, supra note 139, at 35-36; M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO & T. SELLIN,
supra note 139. It is generally agreed, however, that though there is a positive correlation
between repeated delinquency and later criminal activity, it is impossible to predict accu-
rately adult criminality based on violent acts of juvenile delinquency. See Wenk, Robison &
Smith, Can Violence be Predicted? 18 CRIME & DELINQ. 393, 401-02 (1972); THE RELATIONSHIP
OF ADULT CRIMINAL CAREERS TO JUVENILE CAREERS, supra note 141, at 1.
252 Feld, supra note 43, at 512.
253 See Erwin, Five Years of Sentence Review in Alaska, 5 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV. 1, 18
(1975).
254 See T. SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY, A REPORT FOR THE MODEL PENAL CODE PRO-
JECT OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (ALI) § 72-79 (1959); Vitiello, Constitutional Safe-
guards forJuvenile Transfer Procedure: The Ten Years Since Kent v. United States, 26 DE PAUL L.
REV. 23, 39 (1976).
255 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00(3), 70.50 (McKinney 1980).
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Even in those states in which offenders may be sentenced to life impris-
onment without parole, such offenders still may receive commutations of
their sentences by the governor. 256 Thus, even life prisoners have some-
thing to lose if they commit offenses while in prison.25 7 This is especially
true in regard to minors, who are very likely to receive parole or com-
mutation if they behave.258 Juvenile murderers, in fact, tend to be
model prisoners.
2 59
4 Conclusion Regarding the Contribution of Capital Punishmentfor Minors to
Acceptable Coals of Punishment
The execution of minors fails to make a "measurable contribution"
to the goals discussed. Thus, capital punishment for juveniles fails to
meet the requirements of this strand of the excessiveness test of the
eighth amendment, as well as the requirements of the proportionality
strand.
D. THE REMAINING CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM: WHERE TO DRAW
THE LINE
If the death penalty is unconstitutional when imposed on children
and adolescents, the problem of where to draw the line emerges: "Shall
it be 12, 15, 18, 20?'"26 Drawing that line will be a difficult task. It
certainly will require more precise age-related information than has
been provided here. It is possible that even such information may not
provide any clear cutoff point. Surely irresponsible seventeen-year-olds
do not become responsible adults as soon as they reach age eighteen.
Nor does society's responsibility for youth crime suddenly diminish
when the sixteen-year-old turns seventeen.
The difficulty of determining a cutoff age for the imposition of the
death penalty should not stop the courts from making the determina-
tion, however. Line-drawing in cases where there are no bright lines is
endemic to constitutional decisionmaking. The Supreme Court has rec-
256 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
257 See generaly H. BEDAU, THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT 49 (1977); Hertz & Weisberg, supra note 202, at 323 n.29; Zeisel, The Deterrent Eect of the
Death Penall: Facts v. Faiths, 1976 Sup. Cr. REv. 317, 339.
258 See supra note 174 and accompanying text. Maintaining that convicted minors are, for
these reasons, unlikely to commit crimes while in prison is not to suggest that minors are
capable of being deterred by the threat of punishment before they have been arrested and
sentenced and the realities of the situation have hit home. See sura notes 227-43 and accom-
panying text.
259 See Vitiello, supra note 254, at 39; see alo B. ESHELMAN & F. RILEY, s.upra note 197, at
224; UNITED NATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS 144, at 119
(1968).
260 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 59.
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ognized that courts properly may be called upon to draw such lines in
eighth amendment cases.261 Moreover, though psychological and socio-
logical data may not provide the precise cutoff age for the imposition of
the death sentence, the laws of our society do, suggesting age eighteen as
the appropriate mark. It is at this age that society presumes that a per-
son has become responsible and removes the restrictions that were estab-
lished to protect the irresponsible young. Upon reaching eighteen,
people may purchase cigarettes, marry without the consent of their par-
ents, vote,262 and enter freely into contracts. 263 The Model Penal
Code,264 several capital punishment states,26 5 and numerous foreign
countries266 have chosen age eighteen as the cutoff point for the imposi-
tion of capital punishment. Moreover, most states designate eighteen as
the appropriate maximum age for juvenile court jurisdiction.
267
Some nineteen- and twenty-year-olds certainly may be immature
and otherwise less responsible than older adults. However, youth will
remain a mitigating circumstance in their cases, and a constitutional
line drawn at age eighteen is likely to make sentencing bodies particu-
larly sensitive to the maturity and backgrounds of these young adults.
Although a line drawn at age eighteen may prove to be underinclu-
261 See Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983). In Solem, an offender who previously had
been convicted of six felonies in South Dakota state courts was convicted of a seventh felony
(uttering a "no account" check for $100) and was sentenced to life imprisonment without
parole, pursuant to South Dakota's recidivist statute. Solem appealed his life sentence on the
ground that it was disproportionate punishment and therefore violated the eighth amend-
ment. The Supreme Court held that the sentence was unconstitutional. In doing so, the
Court noted that even where there is no bright line indicating the appropriate sentence
length, courts still may draw lines that would make the sentence imposed consistent with the
Constitution. Id. at 3011-12.
262 The twenty-sixth amendment of the Constitution provides that "[t]he right of citizens
of the United States, who are 18 years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of age." U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
263 The sheer inconsistency of sentencing those under 18, who do not have these "adult"
rights, to death is demonstrated vividly by the comment made by the mother of a 15-year-old
awaiting his execution on death row. When prison officials sought her parental consent to
emergency treatment for her son, if he should need it, the mother observed, "Now, isn't that
ironic? . . . He's old enough to be put to death, but he's not old enough to get an aspirin
without our consent." S. GETrINGER, SENTENCED TO DIE 150 (1979).
264 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(1)(d) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); see also MODEL
PENAL CODE § 210.6 comment 133 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980) (affirming
its position that offenders under 18 should not receive the death penalty).
265 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
266 Seveny-three of the 91 countries that have minimum age execution requirements spec-
ify that the offender must be at least 18 years old. See Patrick, The Status of Capital Punihment."
A WorldPerspective, 56 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 397, 398-403, 410 & Table 1
(1965). Reports of the Secretary of the United Nations confirm that "[t]he great majority of
Member States report never condemning to death persons under 18 years of age." UNITED
NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, CAPI-
TAL PUNISHMENT 17 (1973).
267 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
1516 [Vol. 74
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT FOR MINORS
sive in a few cases, it never will be overinclusive. At age eighteen, people
are legally free to leave the custody of their parents and to strike out on
their own.268 Thus, though society may be more responsible for the
crime of a nineteen-year-old than a thirty-year-old, it always will be
most responsible for the offenses of the sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds
whom it forces to remain in bad environments or for whom it fails to
find suitable ones. Moreover, in the overwhelming majority of states,
those over eighteen are the "natural" constituents of the criminal court's
jurisdiction. It was thus with this age group in mind that the legisla-
tures enacted capital punishment statutes to serve the goals of retribu-
tion and general and specific deterrence.
But regardless of where the line is drawn, some line must be drawn;
for, as has been shown, the death penalty is "cruel and unusual" punish-
ment when imposed on very young offenders.
IV. CONCLUSION
In 1977, the capital punishment critic Hugo Bedau was able to
write that "[t]he courts have never drawn a line to protect juveniles as
such from the reach of death sentences . . . on the grounds of the un-
constitutional cruelty and unusualness of such [sentences]. '269 Though
this observation remains true today, the courts increasingly will have the
opportunity to draw this line as more and more juveniles are challeng-
ing the constitutionality of their death sentences. 270 As the constitution-
ality of capital punishment for minors presently is being challenged in at
least one state appellate court,271 the Supreme Court may soon have the
opportunity to draw this line once and for all.
HELENE B. GREENWALD
268 See .supra note 151 and accompanying text.
269 H. BEDAU, supra note 257, at 33.
270 See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
271 Monty Lee Eddings, who committed his capital offense when he was 16 years old, is
challenging the constitutionality of capital punishment for minors in the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals. Telephone Interview with Mr. Jay Baker, Monty Lee Eddings' Attorney
(Dec. 14, 1982).
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